ADAMS v. YOUNG.

ings prior to the receivership, and a more accurate one subsequently ; and the defendant company was directed to pay to the
plaintiff the amount of the net earnings so estimated for a period
of twelve years, or from the date of the defendant's first possession
until the decree, amounting to several hundred thousand dollars.
It was considered by the court, that the defendant company could
not equitably object to such an approximation, since it was its own
fault that a more accurate estimate could not be made; and. in estimating the net earnings, the court did not allow the amount invested
in, permanent improvements to be included in the amount to- be
deducted as expenses from the gross earnings. See, also, Pennock
v. 6oe, 2a How. (U. S.) 117; 2 Redf. Am. Railw. Cas. 667.
G. W. Frir
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A-IAMS v. YOUNGWhere fire is negligently throwNr froni a mill smoke-stack, antcarried- to a building outside the mill property, and thence to another building of a third party, and
thence to other property that is damaged by the fire, whether such negligence is the
proximate cause of such damage is a question of fact for the determination of the
jury under the instructions of the court.
In an action against a mill-owner for damages to property,caused By fire negligently or carelessly thrown by sparks from the smoke-stack of the.mill, and carried
to the property by a gale of wind blowing at the time in the direction of the property, by which fire the same was damaged, where the conditions- continue the same
as when the negligent and careless act was done, and no new cause intervenes, it is
no defence, that the fire first burnod an intervening building, and was thence communicated by sparks and cinders, in the same manner to the bulding in which such fire
consumed the property, though the buildings were separated by a space of two hundred feet.

ERROR to the District Court of Mercer county.
Isaac W. Young brought suit before a justice oft the peace for
$299.97, for household and kitchen furniture, destroyed by the
burning of his family residence, in the town of Macedon, in Mercer
county. On appeal, Young averred in his petition that Adams
owned and controlled a steam-engine, boiler and fixtures, and a
machine for dressing staves, and propelled by steam; that the
engine, boiler and fixtures were placed within one hundred feet
of a frame stable in the town, and within three hundred feet of his
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dwelling-house ; and that the smoke-stack attached to the boiler was
defective and unsafe in this, that the screen upon the smoke-stack
was coarse, and furnished no protection against sparks, and was in
other respects defective, and the defendant well knew the same:
and that.on the 2d day of May 1878, the wind was blowing heavily
from a south-westerly to a north-easterly direction, and in the direction of the stable and the dwelling; and one George Watson, who
was the employee and agent of defendant, and who was managing the machinery, did, on said 2d day of May 1878, fire up and
start the machinery, and so negligently, carelessly, and improperly
run and operate the same, by reason of the defective and insufficient
screen aforesaid, and careless and negligent conduct and management of the machinery, andunder the gale of wind aforesaid, and
the piroximity of the machinery to the stable and dwelling aforesaid, that the sparks from the smoke-stack set fire to the stable and
dwelling-house so occupied by plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore avers
that by carelessness, negligence and improper conduct and management of the machinery, boiler, smoke-stack, &c., and under the
gale of wind aforesaid,by the agent and employee of defendant, the
defendant did set fire to, and burn up and destroy the goods and
chattels, &c., the property of plaintiff.
To the p'etition, Adams answered as follows: (1) That he admits
that the plaintiff was, at the time the same was consumed by fire, the
owner of the personal property, as averred in the amended petition,.
and that the defendant further admits that, at the time, he was the
general owner of the engine, boiler, smoke-stack and machinery
described in the amended petition; but the defendant, in further
answer to the amended petition, says that he denies each and every
averment therein contained, not hereinbefore admitted. (2) And
the defendant, for a second cause of defence, and for a further answer
to the amended petition, says that the stable described in the
amended petition was, at the time of the happening of the pretended
grievances complained of, situated one hundred feet or more in a
north-easterly direction from the engine, smoke-stack and machinery described in the amended petition, and that the dwellinghouse of one James S. Crawford, was then situated two hundred feet
or more in a north-easterly direction from the stable; that the house
of Crawford then contained large quantities of gunpowder, coal-oil
and other explosive and highly combustible substances; and that
the property of plaintiff was situated in a frame building sixty feet
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or more north of the house of Crawford. And the defendant avers
that the fire which burnt and consumed the said property of plaintiff was communicated to said- house of Crawford, by sparks and
cinders from said stable, and from said house- of Crawford to said
house in which plaintiff's said property was situated, and from said
last-named house to said property of plaintiff, and that in no other
manner was said personal property set on fire and destroyed or injured. The said defendant, therefore, prays that he may go hence
without delay, and with his costs.
To the second defence Young demurred, because the same did
not state facts sufficient to constitute a defence. This demurrer was
sustained, and the cause was tried upon the petition and first
defence. The jury found that Young-ought to recover of Adams.
A motion for a new trial was overruled, and-a judgment for Young
was enteredOn proceedings in error , the District Court affirmed the judgment, and plaintiff in error now seeks ta reverse these judgments.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOLLETT, J.-Was, the negligence of Adams the proxiimate cause
of the loss sustained by Young? Thelaw does not regard an injury from a remote cause. There is no dispute- as- to the legal
proposition; the difficulty is as to its proper application to the particular case. The sustaining the demurrer to the second defence is
the only complaint of the plaintiff in error. There is no complaint
of the trial on the first defence, in which the jury found- against
the plaintiff in error, and in which the jury must have found that
his negligence was the proximate cause of the loss of the goods.
Does the second defence show, as a matter of law, a bar to
Young's recovery? This defence is that the fire which burnt and
consumed the property, was communicated to the house of Craw-,
ford by sparks and cinders from the stable, and from the house of
Crawford to the house where the property was situated, and then to
the property. It is not claimed that this fire was not the same fire
communicated to the stable, by sparks from the smoke-stack, when
Adams's agent negligently and carelessly fired up and started the
machinery. So, from the petition and answer, it is shown that the
fire started by Adams, is the fire that consumed the goods. Adams
does not aver or claim there was any new agency or cause at any
point of the line of this fire, and does not aver or claim that the
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"gale of wind" increased in force or changed in direction. The
stable and the houses were not causes of communicating the fire,
but they were only conditions of the communication, existing when
the fire was started. Strictly, the law knows no cause but a responsible will. and, when such a will negligently sets in motion
a natural force that acts upon and with surrounding conditions, the law regards such human actor as the cause of resulting
injury. "As a legal proposition, we may consider it established
that the fact that the plaintiff's injury is preceded by several independent conditions, each one of which is an essential antecedent of
the injury, does not relieve the .person by whose negligence one
of these antecedents has been produced, from liability for such injury." Whart. Neg., sect. 85.
Adams does not aver his ignorance of the surrounding conditions,
or that there was anything unusual about them, or any change as
to them. The objection as to distance. through the air is disposed of
by the averments of the answer, that the fire was thus communicated ;
the surrounding conditions being as they were, and no other cause
being shown. There is no averment that this loss is not a probable and ordinary result of the negligence of the plaintiff in error;
and this principle is an important test, if it is not the only test.
Whart. Neg., sect. 150.
Ryan v. N. Y Cent. Rd. Co., 85 N. Y. 210, and Pennsylvania
Rd. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 853, have been referred to as decisive here. The courts rendering those decisions have sufficiently
"distinguished and explained" them.
In case of Webb v. Rome, W. & 0. Rd. Co., 49 N. Y. 420,
FOLGER, J., on page 427, says: "I do not understand * * * that
the decisions in 35 N. Y. and 62 Penn. St., supra, put forth any
new rule of law, or one which has not been acted upon and recognised paripassu,with the recognition and growth of the principles
upon which most of the cases above cited, are based. In Ryan's
Case, the opinion of the court was, that the action could not be
sustained, for the reason that the damage incurred by the plaintiff
was not the immediate, but the remote result of the negligence of
the defendant."
He then says: "Kerr's Case is the same in material facts, principle and reasoning." And h then says, (page 428): "I am of
opinion that, in the disposition of the case before us, we are not to
be controlled by the authority of the case in 85 N. Y., more than
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we are by that of the long line of cases which precede it." And
the court there held: "He who, by his negligence or misconduct,
creates or suffers a fire upon his own premises, which, burning his
own property, spreads-thence to the immediately adjacent premises,
and destroys the property of another, is liable ta the latter for the
damages sustained by him." And, on the facts there, also held:
"In an action fbr the damages, the questions as to whether defendant was negligent in the use of its property, and as to whether
the injury was the probable consequence of the negligent acts and
omissions, were properly submitted to the jury."
In Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. .ope, 80 Penn. St. 373, Chief
Justice AGNEW says, on page 379: "But let us examine the case

of Bd. Co. v. Kerr, and it will be found to be free from much of
the criticism expended upon it:" "It was not held in Bd.v. Kerr
that when a second building is fired from the first, set on fire through.
negligence, it is a mere conclusion of law that the railroad company
is not answerable to the owner of the second; or that if a fire is
communicated from the locomotive to the field of A., and spreadsthrough his field to the adjoining field of B., A. may be reimbursed
by the company, while 3.must set down his loss to a remote cause,
W.
and suffer in silence." Thus answering Fent v. Toledo, P.
By. Co., 59 Ill. 362 aud358, infra. And in that case the court
held: "Sparks from defendants' engine fired a railroad tie, from
which rubbish, left by the defendants on their road, was fired, communicated with plaintiff's fence next to the road, and spread over
two fields, burned another fence and standing timber six hundred
feet distant from the road. Held, that the proximity of the cause
was for the jury." "In such case the jury must determine whether the facts constitute a continuous succession of events so linked
as to be a natural whole, or whether the chain is so broken as to
become independent, and the final result cannot be said to be the
natural and probable consequence of the negligence of defendants."
In the opinion, the chief justice says (p. 378): "In determining
this relation, it is obvious we are not to be governed by abstractions
which in theory only cut off the succession. Abstractly each blade
of grass or stock of grain is distinct from every other; so one field
may be separated from another by an ideal boundary, or a different
ownership, or it may be by a real but combustible division line."
"It is at this point the province of the jury takes up the successive
facts, and ascertains whether they are naturally and probably related
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to each other by a continuous sequence, or are broken off or
separated by a new and independent cause."
Some states, as Massachusetts and New Hampshire, have provided by statutes that railroad companies shall be liable for damage
caused by fire communicated by its locomotive engines. And in
Perey v. lEastern Rd. Co., 98 Mass. 414, damage was recovered
for injury to property situated half a mile distant from the railroad.
In the state of Kansas damage has been recovered for injury to
property situated many miles distant from the origin of the fire:
Atchison, T. &' S. F. Rd. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354.
In the case of Atchison, T. & S. F, Rd. Co. v. Bales, 16 Kan. 252,
it was held: "Where fire, which is negligently permitted to escape
from an engine of a railroad company, does not fall upon the plaintiff's property, but falls upon the property of another, setting it on
fire, and then spreads by means of dry grass, stubble, and other
combustible materials,-and passes over the land of several different
persons before it reaches the property of the plaintiff, and, finally
reaching the property of the plaintiff at a great distance from where
the fire was first kindled, sets it on fire and consumes it, held, that
the negligence of the railroad company, in such a case, is not too
remote from the injury to the plaintiffs property to constitute the
basis of a cause of action against the company."

In case of Poepper8 v. Missouri, K. & T. By. Co., 67 Mo. 715,
sparks from the locomotive set fire to the prairie where the grass
was rank. The wind was high, and the fire extended three miles
before night, then died down, and the next morning the wind rose,
and carried the fire five miles further, where the fire destroyed
plaintiff's property. The court held "that, as the rise of the wind
was a thing which a prudent man might reasonably have anticipated,
it could not be regarded as the intervention of a new agency, so as
to relieve the company from the consequences of its negligence in
permitting the fire to escape, and that the fire was in fact one conflagration, notwithstanding the lapse of time, and the great distance
over which it travelled before reaching plaintiff's property." In
Missouri this may be correct.

In Delaware, L. &"W. Rd. Co. v. Salmon, 39 N. J. Law 300,
the court held: "Where one, by negligence or misconduct, occasions a fire on his own premises, or the premises of a third person,
which spreads from thence to the plaifitiff's property, and causes an
injury, the injury is not, as a legal proposition, too far removed
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from his negligent act to involve him in legal liability." And 35
N. Y. and 62 Penn. St., swpra, are disapproved.
"The case of Kellogg v. Chiaqo 4 N. W. Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 223,
was fully considered, and the court held: "The maxim, causa
proxima non rernota spectatur, is not controlled by time or distance,
nor by the succession of events. An efficient adequate cause being
found, must be deemed the-true cause, unless some other causer not
incidental to it, but independent- of it is shown to-have intervened
between it and the result. The maxim includes liability for all
actual injuries which are the natural and probable result of the
wrongful act or omission complained of, or were likely to ensue from
it under ordinary circumstances." And 35 N. Y. and 62 Penn. St.,
supra,are disapproved.
In case of Pent v. Toledo .
. By. Oo-., 59 fIl. 34, the
opinion, delivered by Chief Justice LAWRMcu, disapproves of 35
N. Y., and 62 Penn. St., supra, and deals at length with remote
and proximate causes. The court there hodR.- 1 If fire is communicated from a railway locomotive to the house of B., it is not a
conclusion of law that the fire sent forth by the locomotive is to be
regarded as the remote and- not the proximate cause of the injury
to B., but that is a question of fact, to be determined in each case
by the jury, under the instructions of the court. If loss has been
caused by the act, and it was, under the- circumstances, a natural
consequence which any reasonable person could have anticipated,.
then the act is a proximate cause, whether the house burned was
the first or the tenth, the latter being so situated that its destruction
is a consequence reasonably to be anticipated from setting the first
on fire. If, on the other hand, the fire has spread, beyond its natural limits by means of a new agency-if, for example, after its
ignition a high wind should arise, and carry burning brands to a
great distance, by which a fire is caused in a place that would have
been safe but for the wind-such a loss might fairly be set down as
a remote consequence, for which the railway company should not
be held responsible."
In Milwaukee St. P. By. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469, the
claim was that fire was negligently communicated from a steamboat
of the company, by sparks from the chimney, to an elevator of the
company, built of pine lumber, and 120 feet high, and standing on
the bank of the river, and from the elevator to a saw-mill and lumber piles of Kellogg. The mill was 538 feet distant from the ele-
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vator, and the nearest pile of lumber was 388 feet distant from it.
When the steamboat went alongside the elevator, an unusually
strong wind was blowing from the elevator towards the mill and
lumber. The case was from Iowa. The court held: "The question as to what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily not
one of science or of legal knowledge, but of fact for the jury to
determine, in view of the accompanying circumstances." "A finding that negligence, or- an act not amounting to wanton wrong, is
the proximate cause of an injury, is not warranted unless it appear
that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen
in the light of the attending circumstances." "1Where there is no
immediate efficient cause, the original wrong must be considered as
reaching to the effect, and proximate to it."
In the case of Hioyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181,,more than one
building was burned by fire communicated by sparks from a mill
chimney. As to the second building the court held: "even where
such second building is at such a distance from the first, that its
taking fire from the first might not, a priori,seem possible, yet if
it be satisfactorily shown that it did, in fact, thus take fire without
any negligence of the owner, or any fault on the part of any third
party, which could be properly recognised as the proximate cause,
and for which he could be held liable, the party through whose negligence the first building was burned, cannot, on principle, be held
exempt from equal liability for the burning of the second."
These numerous citations show many phrases of this subject, and
that each case must be determined by its peculiar facts, and so is
largely within the province of the jury.
Here explosives are averred to have been in Crawford's house,
but if they ever exploded it is not averred that any injury came
from such explosion. There is shown no new cause operating after
the fire was carried from the chimney of the mill on its destructive
mission. The demurrer was rightly sustained, and the court did
not err in affirming the judgment, and the judgment is affirmed.
The general rule of the common law and in a suitable manner, and uses rearespecting liability for injuries caused by sonable care and diligence to prevent its
fire is well stated in the case of Hewey v. spreading and doing injury to the proNourse, 54 Me. 258, by DicKmEsoN, J.: perty of others. The time may be suit" Every person has a rightto kindle fire . able and the manner prudent, and yet,
en his own land for the purposes of hus- if he is guilty of negligence in taking
bandry, if le does it at a proper time, care of it, and it spreads and injures the
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property of another in consequence of
such negligence, he is liable in damages
for the injury done. The gist of the
action is negligence, and if that exists in
either of these particulars, and injury-is
done in consequence thereof, the liability
attaches ; and it is immaterial whether
the proof establishes gross negligence or
only a want of ordinary care on the part
of the defendant."'
See, generally,
Cooley on Torts 590, and cases cited.
Where the use of stera machinery is
lawful, the same principles apply; If
fires are-kindled by sparks or otherwise
in the use- of it, no action lies unless
negligence appears: Cooley on Torts
591, and cases-cited.
Such being the general principles involved in the principal case, we come
now to the main point of that case. the
extent of the liability where a fire negligently caused has spread to a house adjoining the- one first set on fire by the
negligence ofthe defendant.
In the cases of Ryan v. NY. . Cent.
Rd., 35 N.Y. 210and- Penna. Rd. v.
Kerr, 62 Penn. St. 353, it was held
that, while the party guilty of the neglfgence would be liable to the owner ofthe
adjoining house to which the fire spread,
his liability does not- extend further, and
that he was not liable to the owner of
another house to which the fire had
spread from the burning of the first.
These cases are sufficiently criticised
by the court- in the principal case, and
require nb further notice. They seem to
be foundedmore upon the vicious principle of expediency than upon sound
reason, anti, so far as we caTr see, have
no valid support in reason or authority.
The clear weight of authority is opposed
to them, and they do not seem to be en
tirely satisfactory, even in the states
where they were respectively decided.
See Webb v. Rome, 4-c., Rd., 49 N. Y.
427 ; Pollett v. Long, 56 Id. 206: Oil
Creek, 6-c., Rd. v. Keigiron, 74 Penn.
St. 316; Penna. Rd. v. Rope, 80
Id. 373. The contrary doctrine is so
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well stated by Judge COOLEY, in his
work on Torts (p. 77), that we cannot
do better than use his language : "The
negligent fire is regarded: as a unity;
it reaches the last building as a direct
and proximate result of the original negligence, just as a rolling stone put in
motion down a hill, injuring several persons in succession, inflicts tha last injury
as a proximate result of the original
force as directly as it does the first;
though, if it had been stopped on the
way and started anew by another person,
a new cause would thus have intervened,
back of which any subsequent injury
could not have been traced. Proximity
of cause has no necessary connection
witli contiguity of space or nearness in
time. The slow match, which causes
an explosion after much time and at a
considerable distance from the ignition,
and the libellous letter which is carried
from place to place by different hands
before publication, produce an injurious
result which is as proximate to the cause
and as direct a sequence as if, in the one
case, the explosion had been instantaneous and in the other, the author had
called his neighbors together and read to
them the libel." Citing Smith v. London,
1kc., RI.,L. R.,5 C.P. 98; Perley v.
Eastern Rd., 98 Mass. 414; Clemens v.
Hannibal, 4 c., Ed., 53 Moa. 366 ; B/It
v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. Y81 ; Fent v. Toledo, 4-c., Rd., 59 D. 349; Toledo, 4-c.,
Rd. v. Muthersbaugh,71 Id. 572 ; Annapolis, &c., Rd. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 115 ;
Baltimore, 6-c., Rd. v. Reaney, 42 Id.
117 ; Kellogg v. Chicago, 4-c., Rd., 26
Wis. 223: Hooksett v. Concord, 4-c.,
Rd.,
Rd., 38 N. H. 242 ; Atchison, 'c.,
v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354 ; Kellogg v.
St. Paul, 4-c., Rd., 94 U. S. 469;
Delaware, 4-c., Rde. v. ,Salmon, 39 N. J.
209. The same principle was also ruled,
or assumed as settled, in the following
cases : Atchison, 6-c., Rd. v. Boles, 16
Kan. 252; Poeppins v. Mfissouri, 6-c.,
By., 67 Mo. 715 ; Small v. Chicago, 4-c.,
Rd., 50 Ia. 338; Toledo, 4-c., Ry. v.
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Findar, 53111. 447; Ins. Co. v. Tweed,
7 Wall. 44; Ingersoll v. Stockbridge,
4-c., Rd., 8 Alien 438. See, also, Lehigh Valley Rd. v. MAcKeen, 90 Penn.
St. 122. See, however, The Pennsylvania Co. v. Whllock, 99 Ind. 16, 26 ;
Boa9 v. Lake Shore, 4c., Rd., 18 Am.
L. Reg. (N, S.) 214, and note.

Upon the whole, the principal case
seems to have been decided in accordance with both principle and the clear
weight of authority.
M. D. EwELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
TYLER v. ANDERSON.
Where land is sold at a fixed pirice per acre, and the vendor fraudulently misrepresents the number of acres, the vendee is entitled to an abatement in the
purchase price, although the deed contains, after specifying the number of acres, the
phrase "more or less.'
An answer of failure of consideration must set out the facts showing the failure;
and error in sustaining a demurrer to such an answer is not rendered harmless
merely because a general plea of want'of consideration is left standing.
APPEAL

from Warren Circuit Court.

C. 7. McAdams and Win. P. Rhodes, for appellant.
W.L..Rabourn, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ZOLLARS, J.-Suit upon a promissory note executed in 1882.
The court below sustained a demurrer to the first paragraph of appellant's answer. That ruling is the only question presented for
review here. The substantial averments of that answer may be
epitomized as follows: In 1874, appellant purchased of Ruth V.
Anderson two tracts of land, and received from her two warranty
deeds therefor, copies of which are made a part of the answer. In
one of them the consideration is stated as the sum of $10,800, and
the land is described as the N. E. 4, and E. I N. W. 4, section 24,
township 21 N., range 10 W., containing 240 acres more or less.
In the other the consideration is stated as the sum of $3200, and
the land is described as the E. j S. W. 4, section 13, township 21
N., range 10 W., containing 80 acres, more or less. The contract
of sale entered into by appellant and Ruth V. Anderson was
that appellant should pay for tie 240 acres at the sum of $45 per
acre, and for the other tract of 80 acres at the sum of $40 per acre,
the sale and purchase being by the acre, and not for a gross sum.
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Ruth V. Anderson represented to appellant that one of the tracts
contained 240 acres, and that the other contained 80 acres. In
fact, and by actual measurement, the tract represented as containing 240 acres contains but 235.10 acres, and the other contains but
77.40 acres. Appellant, believing and relying upon the representations as to the number of acres, made no measurement or survey
of the lands, and paid part cash, and gave his notes for the balance
of the purchase-money, calculated at $45 per acre for 240 acres,
and at 840 per acre for 80 acres. These notes were -secured by a
mortgage upon the lands. The deficiency in acreage was unknown
to him for several years after the sale and execution of the deeds,
and until after the execution of the note in suit. At the time Ruth
V. Anderson made the representations, she knew they were not
true, and that the tracts of land did not contain so many acres as
she had represented. The words "more or less" were inserted in
the deeds without appellant's knowledge, and without anything
being said concerning their use. On the day the note in suit was
executed appellee, as the agent of his mother, Ruth V. Anderson,
settled with appellant. In that settlement it was found that appellant yet owed oftbe purchas&-money 6618T. For the purpose of
having the mortgage upon the lands released he paid to appellee, as
the agent of his mother, the whole of said amount, except 8300,
and for that amount agreed to give his note. In pursuance of this
settlement and agreement the mortgage was released, and appellant
executed the note in suit. The land so purchased was the only
consideration for the note. Without the knowledge or consent of
Ruth V. Anderson, the note was made payable to appellee, who was
her son and agent, and appellant signed the same without examination, supposing it was made payable to Ruth V. Anderson, and hadno knowledge to the contrary until this action was commenced.
This plea shows croat Ruth V. Anderson is the owner of the-'note,
in such a sense that whatever defence appellant might have made
had the note been made payable to her he may now make: Waddle
v. Harbeck, 33 Ind. 231; Svindell v. Bikhe,, 41 Id. 281. The
plea also shows that the only consideration for the note is the land;
it being only a renewal, to the extent of it, of the other notes given
for the purchase-money. Any defence, therefore, that appellant
might have made against those notes he may make against this.
Daniel, Neg. Instr. 177.
Appellee contends that, if it should be conceded that there was
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error in sustaining the demurrer to this answer, it was and is a
harmless error, because the facts therein set up might have been
given in evidence under the third answer, in which a want of consideration is alleged in general terms. We think otherwise. There
was a consideration. The note in suit, like those of which it is so
far a renewal, was given for the land. The consideration has failed
to the extent of the note by reason of there being a, less number of
acres of land than agreed upon. An answer of a total or partial
failure of consideration must set out the facts showing the failure:
Billan v. Hercklebrath, 23 Ind. 71.
The important question remains, does the answer properly state
facts sufficient to show a failure of consideration ? The words "more
or less" in a deed, in connection with a description of land, are
used to designate approximately the quantity of the land within the
given boundary. In the absence of contracts, the quantity is always
regarded as a part of the description. And where it appears by
words of qualification, as "more or less," that the statement of the
quantity. of acres in the deed is mere matter of description and not
of the essence of the contract, the buyer takes the risk of the 4uantity, if there be no intermixture of fraud: 4 Kent Com., vide page
467; Martind. Cony. 87; 1 Sugd. Vend. top page 490, bottom p.
324; Williamson v. Hall, 62 Mo. 405; 2 Hil. Real Prop. 535;
King v. Brown, 54 Ind. 368; Langsdalev. Girton,51 Id. 99. This
is the general rule where the land is sold in lump, and for a gross
sum, and there is no fraud or concealment or misrepresentation that
amounts to fraud. An abatement of any portion of the purchase
price on account of a deficit in the number of acres, in all cases
where the quantity is merely a part of the description, rests upon
the ground of fraud
There may be cases where the deficit in the quantity is so great
as to authorize an inference of bad faith and fraud on the part of
the seller.
In the case of Cravens v. Kiser, 4 Ind. 512, it was said: "The
general rule is that where land is sold by metes and bounds, and
estimated to contain a specific quantity, or for ' more or less,' and a
gross sum is paid for the entire tract, the vendee will nor be entitled to an abatement in price should the number of acres fall short
of the estimated quantity. But this rule is not applicable where
there is any fraud or concealment on the part of the vendor. It is
true, the deficit in the quantity might be so great as to authorize
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the inference that the seller acted in bad faith; still such abatement
must proceed on the ground of his fraudulent conduct."
Mr. Sugden lays down these rules: "(1) If an estate be sold at
so much per acre, and tlere is a deficiency in the number of acres
conveyed, the purchaser will be entitled to compensation, although
the estate was estimated at that number in an old survey. (2) The
rule is the same, though the land is neither bought nor sold professedly by the acre. The general rule, therefore, is that, where a
misrepresentation is made as to the quantity, though. innocently,
the right of the purchaseris to have what the vendor can give, with
an abatement for so much as the quantity falls short :" Sugd. Vendc.
bottom p. 324, top p. 489.
These rules more properly apply7 where it appears from the deed
that the land was purchased by the acre, and a certain number of
acres are stated, and where the deed does not contain the words
"more or less." But, although the deed contains these words, the
vendee will be entitled to an abatement in the purchase price, as
against the vendor, and others with, notice, or where the notes are
not commercial paper, to the amount of the deficiency where , by
the fraudulent representations of the vendor- as to the number of
acres, he is induced to enter into a contract that he would not otherwise have entered into, and to pay, or agree to pay, more than he
otherwise would have done. And especially is this so where the
land is purchased at an agreed price by the acre.
While some of the cases seem to distinguish between sales in
gross and by the acre, others hold that there is no difference where
there is fraud. It was held in the case of Thomas v. Beebe, 25
N. Y. 244, that where fraudulent representations relate to the
quantity of land sold, it is immaterial whether the sale is in gross
or by the acre. It was said: " The liability of the defendant for a
,fraudulent representation is as clear if the sale of the farm was in
gross as if it was by the acre. The representations of the defendant may have induced the plaintiff to enter into the contract for the
purchase in gross, instead of by the acre, and there would be great
injustice in depriving him, on that account, of his remedy for the
fraud."
That there may be an abatement in the purchase price, where a
fraud has been practiced upon the vendee, has been many times
held by the court. In the case of HYowic v. Pollard,6 Blackf. 108,
it was said: "If the tracts do not contain the number of acres
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which the vendor represented them to contain, the defendant is
entitled to an abatement out of the purchase-money for so much as
the quantity falls short of the representation." See, also, CJravens
v. Kiser, *ara;Cox v. Beynolds, 7 Ind. 257; Langsdale v.Girton, supra; Reynolcb v. Cox, 11 Ind. 262 ; KenneJy v. Richardson,70 Id. 524. See, also, MAcoun v. Delany, 3 Bibb 46; Bolinger
v. eJewett, 25 Ind. 479.
It is contended by appellee that the defence set up cannot be
allowed without a reformation of the deed. It is a sufficient answer
to this to say that the defence is not based upon the contract as evidenced by the deeds. As said by the New York court in the case
of Thomas v. Beebe, supra, the defence is based upon the fraud
of the vendor, and not upon any warranty or contract on her part
in regard to the quantity of the land. The doctrine, therefore, of
merger of all previous negotiations and representations, and of the
contract, in the deeds, has no application to the case. Fraud cannot be so merged. See, also, Johnson v. Miln, 14 Wend. 195.
See, also, Jines v. Driver, 72 Ind. 125. Although not plainly
asserted or plainly shown, it was upon this theory that parol evidence of fraud was allowed in the several cases above cited.
In the case before us it is alleged in the answer, in substance, as
we have seen, that the amount to be paid for the lands was arrived
at by a calculation upon an agreed price per acre; that the vendor
represented to appellant that one tract contained 240 acres, and
the other 80 acres; that she knew her representations to be false;
and that appellant, in ignorance of the truth, believed, relied upon,
and acted upon the representations thus made to him. Under the
foregoing authorities, and others that might be cited, the facts so
set up in the answer, if true, are such as to entitle appellant to an
abatement from the purchase-money in proportion to the deficiency
in the number of acres of land. That the facts set up in the answer
are true, is admitted by the demurrer. It results from the foregoing that the judgment must be reversed. It is therefore
reversed, at appellee's costs, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to the court below to overrule the demurrer to the second
paragraph of appellant's answer.
General rule.-The general rule is;
that stating in the instrument of conveyauce the quantity of land conveyed, does
not amount to a covenant that the quan-

tity conveyed is the exact number of
acres or feet designated ; Powell v.
Clark, 5 Mass. 355; s. c. 4 Am. Dec.
67 ; Fuller v. Carr, 33 N. J. L. 157 ;
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Campbell v. Johnson, 44 Mo. 247 ;Howe
v. Bass, 2 Mass. 380; Williams v.
Hathaway, 19 Pick. 387; Tarbell v.
Bowman, 103 Mass. 341 ; Mann v. Pearson, 2 Johns. 37 ; Jackson v. Defendorf,
I Caines 493; Jackson v. Harringer,15
Johns. 471; Dozier v. Dqffee, I Ala.
320 ; Eubank v. Hampton, 1 Dana 343 ;
Ragan v. Gwinn, 19 La. Annr. 133j
Barrowv. Milter, 16 Id. 114 ; Davuis v.
Millandon, 17 Id. 97 ; Commissioners v.
Thompson, 4 McCord-(S. C.) 434. Thus
where laud was described in the deed as
amounting to fifty acres, and the grantor
covenanted that he was fully seised of
" said land," had: a good- right to convey the same, that it was unincumhered,
and that he would forever warrant and
defend the title, it was held, in an action
for a breach of the warranty, in that the
land did not contain fifty acres, that the
statement of the-number of acres was no
part of the warranty:. Austin v. Richardi,
7 Heisk. 663; see Kincaid v. .Brittain,5
Sneed 119; P-ark v. Cheek, 4 Cold. 20;
Etheridgev. Vernoy, 70 N. C. 713. In
the case last cited- the rule of caveat
emptor was applied. althoughi the loss
was 162 acres in 2000 : see Boar v.
McCormick, 1 S. & R. 166; Vaugharv.
Mitchell, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 100 ; Cox v.
Couch, 8 Penn. St. 147.
Strictmeasure.-In-some instances the
words "strict measure '1 is used immediately after the enumerated, number of
acres supposed to be conveyed. These
words add nothing to the deed, nor in
any way affect it. Thus the land was
described as "containing 200 acres strict
measure, and no more." The quantity
conveyed exceeded 200 acres; and it
was held that the grantee took thewhole.
"The words of exact restriction to 200
acres and no more in the deed to the defendant, could never be allowed to supersede or control a palpable description so
easily traceable, as was the Lawrence
survey through its monuments and
courses:" Jackson v. McConnell, 19

Wend. 175. Another deed, after the
description by metes and bounds, had
the words "containing 195 acres ofland,"
and after excepting two pieces, one of 50V
acres, and the other of 16, it was- added:
"There being in the lot hereby conveyed
135 acres, strict measure, the surplus, if
any, not being hereby conveyed." It
turned out that there was less than 135
acres. In an action on the.covenants of
the deed because of the deficit in acres,
it was held that the wording of the deecd
as given, did notamount to a warranty
that there were 135- acres: oat v. Puff,
3 Earb. 353; see Andrews v. Rue, 34
N. J. L. 402; Surgiv. Shooter, 17 La.
Ann. 68. Qurere, if there had been over
135 acres r See last case ciited.
More or less.-As in the principalcase
it is the practice, often, to add the words
"more or Iess!' to the quantity stated.
These words are, usually considered as
expressions that the grantor will not hold
himself liable for his representations
of
quantity : Andrews v. Rue, 34 N. J. L.
402 - Weart v. Rose, 16 N. J. Eq. 290 : •
Course v..Boyles, 21 Id. 212; Date v.
Smith, I Del. Ch. I ; s. c.12 Am. Dec.
64 ; Williford v. Bentley, 5 J. J. Marsh.
181.
The expression is also construed to
mean that the parties to the deed are to
run the risk of gain or loss in the estimatecl quantity: McCoun v. Delany, 3
Bibir. 46 ; s.c.6 Am. Dec. 635 ; Young
v. Craig, 2-Bibb. 272 ; Cutts vKing, 5
Me. 482 ; Blaney v. Rice, 20 Pick. 62;
Chandlerv. McCord, 39 Me. 564; Aarshall v. Bompart, I8 Mo. 84 ; Dalton v.
Rust, 22 Tex. 133; Sanders v. Godding, 45 Ia. 463; Whiting r. Dewey, 15
Pick. 428. The words "neither limit
nor extend the grant:" Pierce v. Pounce,
37 Me. 67. In a case already cited it is
said that they are "meaningless words:"
Campbell v. Clark, 6 Mo. 219 ; Ayres v.
Hayes, 13 Id. 252 ; Butterfiddv. Cooper,
6 Cow. 481 ; .Marvln v. Bennett, 26
Wend. 169 ; Faure v. Martin, 7 N. Y.
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210; Voarhees v. Deifeer,2 Barb. 37;
Lawrence v. Simonton, 13 Tex. 220.
Describing the tract conveyed as containing so many acres, has the same effect
as if the words "more or less" were
added: Williams v. Lane, 2 Car. L.
Rep. (N. C.) 266.; s. c. 6 Am. Dec.
561. See the English cases; Day v.
Fynn, Owen 133, cited in 9 Vin. Abr.
343; Anon., Freeman's Ch. 106; Troyford v. Wareup, Finch. 310 ; Townshend
v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 340.
If the land conveyed has well defined
boundaries, fixed and visible monuments,
the enumeration of the number of acres
supposed to be within such boundaries and monuments, is no part of the
general covenant of warranty. In all
such cases the purchaser gets just exactly
what he purchased; Date v. Smith, 1
Del. (Ch.) 1, s. c. 12 Am. Dec. 64;
Peay v. Briggs, 2 Mills (S. C.) 98; s.
c. 12 Am. Dec. 656 ; Johnston v.
Quarles, 3 La. 90; s. c. 22 Am. Dec.
163; Andrewsv. Rue, 34N. J. L. 402;
Williams v. Lane, 2 Car. L. lep. 266 ;
s.c. 6 Am. Dec. 561 ; Couse v. Boyles, 4
N. J. Eq. 212; Weart v. Rose, 16 Id
290 ; Grand Trunk By. v. Dyer, 49 Vt.
74; Pernam v. Mead, 6 Mass. 131 ;
Chipman v. Brlggs, 5 Cal. 76; Allerton
v. Johnson, 3 Sandf. Ch. 72. But a
representation that all the land within
certain defined boundaries is intended to
be conveyed, and that it contains so
much in area, will amount to a fraud if
all the land within such boundaries is
not conveyed by the deed : Brooks v.
Riding, 46 Ind. 15 ; Rutherford v.
Tracy, 48 Mo. 325 ; Hampton v. Eubank,
4 J. J. Marsh. 634.
As has already been stated, a sale by
the bulk cannot alone be construed a
warranty of the quantity stated: Hershey v. Keembortz, 6 Barr 128; Kreiter
v. Bomberger, 82 Penn. St. 59; s. a. 22
Am. Rep. 750; Morris Canal Co. v.'
Emmett, 9 Paige 168; Innis v. MCrammin, 12 Mart. (La.) 425; Gormley v.
Oakey, 7 La. 452; Triplett v. Allen, 26

Gratt. 721 ; s. c. 21Am. Rep. 320. If
the land be sold as containing so many
acres, " be the same more or less," or
equivalent words are used, at a certain
price per acre, and there is no stipulation of quantity, nor any mala fides,
there is no redress after the contract is
closed ; and if there is no written contract, the execution of the deed is the
closing of the bargain: Sugden on
Vendors 369; Lawrence v. Staigg, 8 R.
I. 256 ; Barnes v. Gregory, 1 Head.
230; Weart v. Rose, 16 N. J. Eq. 290;
Tarbell v. Bowman, 103 Mass. 341.
Sale by the acre.-The instance last
given is of a sale by the acre, but the
staterhent of the number of acres was
not of the essence of the contract. If the
statement is of the essence of the contract
and there is a deficiency in the quantity
stated, the purchaser is entitled to a corresponding deduction from the price.
See cases last cited. In such an instance,
the quantity is relied upon to fix the
price: Pickman v. Trinity Church, 12a
Mass. 1 ; s. C. 25 Am. Rep. I ; Triplett v. Allen, 26 Gratt. 721 ; s. c. 21
Am. Rep. 320; Campbell v. Wimore, 6
J. J. Marsh. 209; Jones v. Plater, 2.
Gill (Md.) 125. If it was the intention to sell by the acre, and not by the
bulk, as can be gathered from the contract, the insertion of the words "more
or less" wil not prevent a recovery for
the deficiency: Wilson v. Randall 67
N. Y. 338 ; Fannin v. Bellomy, 5 Bush
663. In a Virginia case it was said
that, in the absence of evidence to show
that a hazard was intended, it will be
presumed that the parties contracted
with reference to quantity. "It is an
important element in every agreement,
and primafacie must be intended to influence the price: Triplett v. Allen, 26
Gratt. 721; S. U. 21 Am. Rep. 320;
Whaley v. Eliot, 1 A. K. Mar. 343;
s.c. 10Am. Dec. 737; Faiiing v. Osborne, 3 Ore. 498; Hutchings v. Moore,
4 Met. (Ky.) 110. If the sale is by
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bulk, a much larger deficit must be
shown to entitle the claimant to relief
than is required in a sale by the acre:
Rich v. Ferguson, 45 Tex. 396; Terrell
v. Kirksey, 14 Ala. 209 ; Weaver v.
Carter, 10 Leigh. 37.
Sale in bulk.-If the amount of the
purchase-money is expressed in a gross
sum, it is the general rule that it is not
a sale by the acre, butin gross: Cravens
v. Kiser, 4 Ind. 512. Thus, where the
deed described the land as "containing
91I acres, more or less, being the house
and all the land whereon C. now resides," and the sale was for $10,500, a
part payable down, and the "remaining
unpaid balance to be paid at the rate.of
$114.40 per acre ;" and-the $1O,500 was
about four dollars more than 9l. acres
at $1 4.40 ; and the land,.by a subsequent survey, was found to contain 118
acres; it was held that the $tO1,500 was
the surn fixed to be paid as the purchasemoney, and G. could not recover-for the
excess above 91J acres, although the
contract was an executory one: Coughenour v. Stauft, 77 Penn. St. 191. See
Gillilam v. Hinkte, 8 W. Va. 262. In a
recent English case the land was described as "containing, by estimation,
three acres or thereabouts," and it appeared that the vendor himself purchased
it by this description, and believed it to
contain that quantity, but it, in fact,
contained two acres, onerood and twelve
perches. It was held that there was no
breach of any warranty, and the purchaser was not entitled to any compensation. The purchase-price was a gross
sum: Jollfee v. Baker, 23Am. L. Reg.
162.
Military worrants.-In the case of a
military warrant (issued at an early
dayy quantity was its controlling feature, and without its being designated,
the warrant was void. After issuance,
the holder could locate it at any place
upon the public domain. When these
warrants were first issued the public
VOL. X=V.-73

domain was unsurveyed, and each locator must run out his own lines and
locate his own corners; and as his only
object-was to locate the quantity designated in the warrant, the courts adopted
the rule that " the call and course must
yield to the call for quantity, the latter
being the most important call in the
entry:" Croghan v. Arelson, 3 How.
187. The rule applicable to these warrants is not, therefore, the general rule
followed with reference to the statement
of quantity.
Conveyance by/ government surveys.Conveying the land by the government
surveys-is no warranty- that the parcel
contains the quantity designated by tHe
survey - Doe, ea dem. Phillps, v. Porter,
&Ark. IS; s.c. 36 AurL-Dee. 448 ; Withamson v. Half,. 6Z7 Io. 405; Harrell
V. Hilt, 19 Ark. 102.
Known by a particularname.-The instances just given; is-where land is known
by a designated number. Land may also
be known by a certain name. If conveyed by such name, the designating of
the quantity supposed to be conveyed
will not be a warranty of the amount intended to be conveyed. Thus a grant
was of the surplus of the" Raneho of
Old and New San Jacinto." out of which
two grants had beenr previously made;
and the surplus was described as "the
extent of which is about five leagues,
more or less." The surplus, in fact,
embraced abouteleven leagues. It was
held that the entire eleven leagues passed
by the grant-: United Slatesv. Aguirre,
1 Wall. 311. In the case given there
was a mutual mistake. 1-n such an instance, both parties are bound : .3foore
v- Vicc 2-How. (Miss.) 746 ; s. C. 32
Am. Dec. 30I ; Clark v. Scammon, 62
Me. 47.
No boundaries.-Land may be conveyed without designating the boundaries, or any corners or monuments marking its extent, but by designating the
number of acres intended to be con-
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veyed. In aff such instances, the num- the boundaries to be ascertained by a
ber of acres designated is am essential subsequent survey, only the number of
part of the description. Thus, it was acres designated are conveyed, even
held that a tract of land containing 843 though the words "more or less" follow
acres could not be conveyed by a descrip- the number given. Thus, where an aption of "Iall
that tract of land, contain- plication was made to the government to
ing 190 acres, more or less, situate in the purchase two leagues of land, "more or
district of Barnwell, bounded on the less," according to certain designated
lands of William Nimmons and others :" boundaries; and the grant did not menKirkland v. Way, 3 Rich. L. (S. C.)
tion the quantity, but provided for the
4; s. c.45 Am. Dec. 752. It was said measurement of the tract and reservation
that the number of acres was the only of the surplus, the court construed the
certain description in the deed; and to grant in connection with the petition, and
reject the number rendered the deed held that the two leagues mentioned in
more uncertain and obscure. "Giving
the petition were to be surveyed within
effect to the number of acres mentioned the larger tract, but observed that if the
in the'deed, as an essential part of the boundaries had been defined in the grant,
description, it does not appear that the no surplus could be thrown off by a surtract found for the plaintiff in this suit vey. In this way only could the condiwas the same which was conveyed to him. tional clause as to the measurement and
A tract answering to the other imperfect surplus be made consistent with the preterms of description, but containing 843 vious language of the grant: Yontz v.
acres, is not the same which was de- United States, 23 How. 498; see United
scribed as containing 190 acres." In States v. Fossat, 20 Id. 413.
A testator devised to his grandson 350
another case, in the same state, a tract
was described as "containing 360 acres, acres of land, "being the upper part of
bounded on lands belonging to A., B., a tract of 700 acres ;" and to his two
C. and others." On resurvey, it was granddaughters ,1the lower part of the
found to contain only 343 acres. A dis- same tract, to be equally divided be.
count for the deficiency was allowed. It tween them." The tract was found to.
was said that "the laud is not so de- contain, in fact, 1100 acres. It was held
scribed by metes and bounds as to fur- that the grandson was entitled to only
nish any data by which the number of 350 acres, and the granddaughters to 375
acres might be known. It is described acres each: Williams v. Lane, 2 Car. L.
as joining the lands of other persons (N. C.) 266; s. a. 6 Am. Dec. 561.
merely for the purpose of fixing the See Bartlett v. Corli.ss, 63 Me. 287 ;
locality :" Talbot v. Mason, 2 McCord Harper v. Lindsey, Meigs (Tenn.) 310.
(S. C.) 440. See Peay v. Briggs, 2
Covenant as to amount.-It is possible
Mill. 98; s. c. 12 Am. Dec. 656;
Barksdale v. Toomer, Harp. (S. C.) for the grantor fa bind himself by a covenant that the amount stated in the deed
290; Welch v. Phillips, I McCord (S.
is the true amount. And words used in
C.) 215. In case the boundaries are
a deed may amount to a covenant, aldoubtful, quantity often becomes a conthough not in the express terms of a
trolling feature of the deed : Winans v.
covenant. Thus, where land was deCheney, 55 Cal. 567; Fieldv . Columbet,
scribed by the governmental surveys,
4 Sawy. 523.
and followed by the clause, "the whole
Conveyance out of a'larger tract.-If of the within-described lands contain in
the conveyance is of a designated num- all 1268.71-100 acres," it was held that
ber of acres out of a larger tract named, these words constituted a covenant as to
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the quantity of the land: Minge v.Smnith,
1 Ala. 415.
Fraudulent representation. - If any
fraud is attempted in giving the number
of acres, the words "more or less" will
not care it: Cravens v. Kiser, 4 Ind.
512 ; Langsdale v. Girton, 51 Id. 99 ;
Xreiter v. Bomberger, 82 Penn. St. 59 ;
s. o. 22 Am, Rep. 750 ; Failing v.
Osborn, 3 Ore. 498; Noble v. Googin,
99 Mass. 231 ; McCann v. Delaney, 3
Bibb. 46 ; s.o. 6 Am. Dec. 635 - Dale
v. Smith, 1 Del. Ch. 1; s. c. 12 Am.
Dec. 64. If, as an inducement to the
sale, the vendor states the amount to be
of so many acres, and says he knows soi
of his own knowledge, his statement
amounts to a fraud on the vendee, if the
amount is not so great, even though he
believes the number is as he states it;
and this too, ever though the vendee
would have made the purchase without
such representation : Cabot v. Christiex
42 Vt. 121 -see Jollfee v. Baker, 23
Am. L. Reg. 162 ; but see Winch v.
Winchester, I Ves. & B. 375,

.Tolliffee v. Baker, 23 Am. L. Reg. 162 ;
Kreiterv. Bomberger, 82 Penn. St. 59 ;
s. c. 22 Am. Rep. 750, 754; Nobe v.
Googins, 99 Mass. 231 ; Weart v. Rose,
16 N. J. Eq. 290; Ketchum v. Stout, 20
Ohio 453 ; Jenkins-v. Bolgiano, 53 Md.
407; Peen, v. Owens, Rice Ch. (S. C.)
55. Usually if the purchaser gets exactly
what he purchased, he is bound by the
contract, although he-may be mistaken
as to the quantity : Jacoby v.Beckett, 19
Ind. 395 - Andrews v. Rue, 34 N. J. L.
402; Couse v. Bogles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212;
Smith v. Negbauer, 42 N. J. L. 30&;
Ctar&v Scammon, 62 Me. 47.

Gross errors.-Where the deficiency is
small, no relief is granted, unless there
is a covenant as to the quantity ; if it is
great, then it is evidence of fraud ; and
when unexplained it will be sufficient to
set aside the deed or contract: Solinger
v. Jewett, 25 Ind. 479 ; Quesnel v. Woodlief, 2 Hen. & Man. 173; Campbelv.
Wilmore, 6 J. J. Marsh. 209; Thomas
v. Perry, I Pet. C. C. 49; Putnam v.
Hill, 38 r. 85 ; Boar v. McCormick,
Concealment.-Any concealment on 1 S. & R. 166; Glen v. Glen, 4 Id.
the part ofthe vendor which prevents in- 488; Bailey v. Snyder, 13 Id. 160;
quiry as to the amount of the land sold Ashcom v. Smith, 2 Penn. St. 219; Fredor conveyed, will avoid the sale if the erick v. Campbell, 13 S. & R. 136 ; Hagquantity falls short: Cravens v. Kiser, 4 gertyv. Fagan, 2 Penn. St. 533 ; CoughsInd. 512 ; Dale v. Smith, 1 Del. Ch. 1 ; nour v. Stauft, 77 Id. 191 ; Darling
s.c.12 Am. Dec. 64 ; Couse v. Bogles, v. Osborne3 51 Vt. 148 ; see Heath v.
4 N. J. Eq. 212 ; Cabot v. Christie, 42 Pratt, 5 Id. 238. Iansucha case the comVt. 121. Such would be the case where plaining party must not have been guilty
the amount stated in-the- negotiations is of any fraud or culpable negligence, nor
known to be false, even though the words otHerwise have impaired the equity result"more or less" are used in the deed : ing from a mistake: Harrisonv. Buckley,,
Ketcham v. Stout, 20 Ohio St. 453; 17 Ves. 355 ; Belknap v. Sealey, 4 Kern.
Cabot v. Christie, 42 Vt. 121 ; Hill v. 143 ; olliffee v.Baker, 23 Am. L. Reg.
Buckley, 17 Ves. 394 ;Baldwin v. Shan- 162.
nor, 43 N. T. L. 596.
Purchasefor a particularpurpose.-A
Equalknowedge.-If both vendor and purchase may be made for a particular
vendee have the same means of ascer- purpose. If the vendor is aware of the
taining the exact quantity, and neither design of the vendee in making the purknows it, a deficiency will not avoid the chase, at the time it is made, and there
deed, unless it is so great as to raise the is a deficiency, and the purchase thus
presumption that a mutual mistake was fails to meet the object of the purchaser,
made: Allen v. Gibson, 53 Ga. 600; the vendee may be relieved of his obliga-
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Md. 152; Kreiter Y. Bomberger, 82
Penn. St. 59 ; s. C. 22 Am. Rep 750 ;
Smith v. Evans, 6 Binn. 102. Laches
may be a ground for refusing relief: Delaney v. McDonald, 47 Wis. 108; see
Wilson v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338 ; Taure
v. Martin, 7 Id. 210; Martin v. Chambers, 84 Ill. 579. This defence may be
urged in a suit for the purchase-money
as in the principal case: Mendenhall v.
Executory and executed contracts.-In
granting relief because of a deficiency or Steckel, 47 Md. 453 ; a. o. 28 Am. Rep.
481 ; Darling v. Osborne, 51 Vt. 148;
excess, the courts are inclined to draw
v.
no distinction between executed and Noble v. Googins, 99 Mass. 231 ; Hill
"Bucldey, 17 Ves. 394; Townshend v.
executory contracts. "The principle is
the same whether the contract only be Stangroom, 6 Id. 341; Davis v. Sabita,
63 Penn. St. 90.
executed or has been consummated by
Specific performance.-If the purchaser
giving the deed; the injury is the same
which the party sustains in the one case discovers there is a deficiency before he
as the other, the mode of redress, and gets his deed, he may still insist on a speciindeed the power of the court over the fic performance of the contract, or he may
case may be very different :" Couse v. rescind it at his pleasure ; and insisting
Boles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212, 216; Ketchum upon performance does not deprive him
v. Stout, 20 Ohio 453, 461 ; Noble of his right to a deduction for the defiv. Googins, 99 Mass. 231 ; Hoback v. ciency : Ketchum v. Stout, 20 Ohio St.
Kilgores, 26 Gratt. 442; s. o. 21 Am. 452, 459; Malins v. Freeman, 2 Keen
Rep. 317 ; Blessing v. Beatty, I Rob. 25 ; Manser v. Back, 6 Hare 443 ; Les287 ; Triplett v. Allen, 26 Gratt. 721 ; liev. Thompson, 9 Hale 268 ; seePomeroy
s.o. 21 Am. Rep. 320 ; Mendenhall v. on Specific Performance, sec. 245.
W. W. TMoRNToN.
Steckel, 47 Md. 453; s. c. 28 Am.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
Rep. 481; Mfarbury v. Stonestreet, I
tion - for the object of the purchase has
failed, and he has been indirectly imposed
upon: Bond v. Quattlebaum, I MeCord
(S. C.) 548; s. C. 10 Am. Dec. 702 ;
King v. Brown, 54 Ind. 368, 375. But
the insufficiency in quantity must be so
great as to defeat the object of the purchase: Pringle v. Witten, I Bay (S.
C.) 256 ; s.c. 1 Am. Dec. 612.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
JONES v. FLORENCE MINING COMPANY.
Where a master employs, to work in a dangerous place, a servant who from youth,
inexperience or ignorance, is unable to appreciate the danger, it is the duty of the
master to explain the nature of such danger, and if without such explanation the
servant is set to work, either by the master or his agent, and is injured, the master
is liable, even though the danger would have been apparent to a person of capacity
and knowledge, and the immediate cause of the injury is the negligence of co-employees.

A boy, under fifteen years of age, who was employed by a mining company to
carry drills above ground, went into the mine, and while carrying drills there was
injured by the fall of ore from the roof. There was some evidence that he had
been sent into the mine by either the captain or the pit boss, and that no explanation had been given him as to the dangerous character of the place. The weight
of the evidence tended to show that the fall of the ore was the result of the negli-
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gence of the miners themselves and not of the company or its subordinate officers.
Held, that it was error for the court below to direct a verdict for defendant.
Semble. The duty of guarding against the danger resulting from leaving loose
stones or ore in the roof or sides of a mine is one which the employer may reasonably impose on the miners themselves, but if a neglect of this duty is brought to the
knowledge of the master and he takes no steps to remove the danger, he is liable
to an employeewho without contributory negligence is injured thereby.
-Patersoav.Wallace, I Macq. 748,and Rall v.Johnson, 3 H. & C. 589, compared.
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The opinion of the court was delivered- by
TAYLOR, S.-The appellant, a minor, brought this action to
recover damages for an. injury which he sustained while in the employ of the respondent company. The uncontroverted facts in the
case are as follows : The appellant was at the time of the accident,
according to his testimony, less than fifteen years old. He had been
employed three weeks before by the companyto work above ground,
carrying drills and other tools from the mouth of the mine then
being worked by the company, to the blacksmith-shop for repairs,
and bringing them back to the mouth of the mine; that he had
been so employed for about three weeks before he was injured;
that on the day the injury was received the appellant had gone
down into the mine, and was at work there carrying the drills from
the place where they were used by the miners to the bottom of the
shaft and putting them into the bucket, going up with them, and carrying them tothe blacksmith-shop for repairs, and then returning them
to the miners in mine No. 1 ; and that while he was in the mine,
sitting down and waiting to take some drills which the miners were
still using, a large piece of ore fell from the roof of the mine and
struck him upon the leg, and so injured it that it became necessary to amputate it. To recover damages for this injury this action
was brought.
Whether the appellant was sent into the mine by either the
superintendent or captain of the mine, or by the mine boss, is a
controverted question. The appellant, and at least one of the witnesses, testified on the trial that he was, on the morning of the day
on which the accident happened, sent down into the mine to work
in carrying and returning drills as above stated ; and that previous
to this time he had not worked in the mine at all, although he
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admits he had been down in the mine a few times before, but had
not been sent there to do any work until the morning of the accident. The captain of the mine and pit boss both testified that the
appellant was not sent into the mine by either of them to do any
work, but, on the contrary, that he had been forbidden by them to
go down into the mine for any purpose. It is shown by the evidence that the appellant was placed under the pit boss, with instructions to do what the boss required him to do. There was
testimony given on the trial, on the part of the appellant, showing
that the pit boss was notified several times before the accident
happened that the roof of the mine was in a dangerous condition,
at the place where the accident happened, and that it ought to
be attended to at once; and that the captain of the mine was
informed the day before the accident happened that the roof of
the mine was. in a dangerous condition. The same witnesses also
testified, that it was the duty of the pit boss to see that the mine
is made all safe. This fact was also controverted, and on the part
of the defendant, the evidence was that it was the duty of the
miners themselves to see to the safety of the roof and walls of the
mine, especially to see that all loose or dangerous rocks or ore was
removed from the roof of the mine. But as the circuit judge
directed a verdict for the defendant, we must, for the purposes of
this appeal, consider the testimony given on the part of the appellant, as though it were uncontradicted by the evidence given on
the part of the respondent; and the question is, whether, upon the
evidence given by the appellant, the jury would have been justified
in finding a verdict for the appellant.
On the part of the appellant it is claimed that, upon the evidence produced, the jury would have been justified in finding a
verdict for the plaintiff upon two grounds: First. That it was the
duty of the company to see that the roof of the mine where the
plaintiff was at work was kept in a reasonably safe condition, and
that if the injury occurred from a want of reasonable care on the
part of the company in keeping the roof of the mine in such safe
condition, then the company is liable to the plaintiff for the damages sustained. Second. That the zompany owed a duty to the
plaintiff, who was a minor not over the age of fifteen years,
if it sent him to work in a dangerous place, to fully instruct
him as to the danger of the employment; and if it neglected so
to instruct him, and he was injured by reason of a danger of which
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he was not informed, and of which he had no adequate knowledge,
then the defendant is liable, even though the accident was caused
by the neglect of those employed in the mine, and not of the company.
On the part. of the respondent it is claimed that the plaintiff was
properly nonsuited. First, for the reason that the evidence conclusively shows that the accident happened solely through the fault
of the miners working in the mine with the plaintiT, and so occurred
through the fault and negligence of the co-employees of the plaintifi and not through the fault of the company; second, if it
should be admitted that it was the duty of the pit boss to see that
the roof of the mine was kept in a safe condition, and the accfdent
happened through the negligence of such pit boss, such negligence
on his part would be the negligence of a co-employee, and not the
negligence of the company, and the company would not be liable;
third, that the injury occurred by reason of an accident which is
incident to the business of working in minesj the risk of which the
employee assumes when he enters the service, and there is no express or implied contract on, the- part of the mining company to
protect him against such accidents.
As to the first point made by the appellant we are not prepared
to say that it is well taken. There is the statement of one witness
on the part of the plaintiff, made in a general way, "that the pit
boss is supposed to get ore out of the mine, and see that the back is
all right, and make the mine all safe." This is the only evidence
given on that subject on the part of the appellant upon that point,
and there is no explanation by the witness showing from what
source he obtained his information as to the duty of the pit boss
in this respect. On the part of the respondent the evidence is very
strong that it was and is the duty of the miners themselves to see
that the roof and sides of the mine are made safe against all danger from loose ore or stones, in the roof or sides of the mine in
which they are working at the time, and as to that matter the pit
boss has no particular charge or duty. We have grave doubts whether it would be our duty to set aside the nonsuit upon this point
alone, where the evidence is so overwhelmingly against the plaintiff. There may be other dangers in the working and management
of a mine which the court would, even in the absence of evidence,
charge the employers with the duty of guarding against for the
protection of those in their employ; but the danger resulting from
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leaving loose stones or ore in the roof or sides of the mine is a danger which the employer may well impose the duty of guarding
against upon those working in the mine. Such danger is the direct
result of their operations, and they are always on the ground, and
.have better facilities for knowledge when a danger of that kind
exists, and for removing the same, than the pit boss or captain of
the mine, and there would seem to be no ground for holding that
the owner of the mine may not impose such duty upon the miners
themselves.
• A different question might have arisen had the proofs shown that
notwithstanding the general duty of the miners to provide against
this aanger, they had neglected to perform their duty, and the
knowledge of this neglect had been brought home to the captain of
the mine, or even the pit boss, and no steps bad been taken, within
a reasonable time, to remove such danger, or cause it to be removed,
and an accident bad happened, after such neglect, to an employee
whose duty did not require him to protect himself against such
danger. See Gilman v. Rd. Co., 13 Allen 433, 441, 442, and
cases there cited.
A case of that kind was decided by the House of Lords on an
appeal from a Scotch court, and adversely to the mining company:
Patersonv. Wallace, 1 Macq. 748. That was a mining case. The
action was brought by the widow and children of the husband and
father, who had been killed, while in the employment of the defendants, in their mine, by the falling of a stone from the roof of the
main road of the mine, while the deceased was at work in the mine
at the spot where the stone fell. The evidence showed that the
underground manager of the mine had notice of the dangerous condition of the stone before the accident happened, in time to have
removed it before it fell; that he advised the workmen that there
was no immediate danger, and afterwards promised to remove it,
and sent some persons to remove it, but before they reached the
place the stone fell and killed the deceased. Upon that proof, the
Scotch cpurt directed a verdict for the defendant; and upon appeal
to the House of Lords the judgment was reversed; that court
holding that, upon the evidence, the case should have been submitted to the jury, because the evidence of the plaintiffs showed
that the underground manager of the mine knew of the dangerous
condition of the stone, and having such knowledge, it became his
duty to cause it to be removed within a reasonable time, and if he
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neglected so to remove it, and an injury happened to a person working in the mine by reason of such neglect, the company was liable
in damages to the person so injured. In the opinion in that case it
is said the court ought to have stated the law to the jury as follows:
"That if Snedden, the defendant's manager, had failed in his duty
in tihacously directing the stone in question to be removed, it would
afford no defence that Paterson continued to work after the orders
for the removal of the stone had been actually given." There was.
nothing in the case tending to show that it was a part of Paterson's
duty to protect himself against the defect in the roof of the mine.
This case seems to be in conflict with the case of Ball v. Johnson, 3 Hurl. & C. 589, cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, and much relied on in their brief in this case. In Hall v.
Johnson, in the Exchequer Chamber, the court decided, in a case
almost identical in its facts with the case of Paterson v. Wallace,
that the defendant was not liable, and sustained a nonsuit ordered
by the trial court on the ground that the underground manager,
or, as he was designated in the last case, "under-looker," whose
duty it was to see that the roofs of the mine were propped and made
secure, was a co-employee with the person injured. Whether, upon
all the facts in the two cases, they can stand together, or whether
the cases are to be reconciled, upon the ground that the law in Scotland upon the subject of the liability of the master to the servant
is different from the law in England, we need not consider in this
case, as we have concluded that the judgment in this case must be
reversed upon the sound proposition made by the learned counsel
for the appellant.
We think it is now clearly settled that if a master employs a
servant to do work in a dangerous place, or where the mode of
doing the work is dangerous and apparent to a person of capacity
and knowledge of the subject, yet if the servant employed to do
work of such a dangerous character or in a dangerous place, from
youth, inexperience, ignorance or want of general capacity, may
fail to appreciate the dangers, it is a breach of duty on the part of
the master to expose a servant of such character, even with his own
consent, to such dangers, unless he first gives him such instructions
or cautions as will enable him to comprehend them, and do his work
safely, with proper care on his part. This rule does not in any
manner conflict with the other well-established rule, that the employee in any particular business assumes all the risks and hazards
VOL. XXXI V.-74
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which are incident to such business, when the employee is of sufficient intelligence and knowledge to comprehend the dangers incident to his employment; and in the case of an adult person, in the
absence of evidence showing the contrary, the presumption is that
the employee has sufficient intelligence to comprehend the dangers
incident to his employment: Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co.,
102 Mass. 572; Sullivan v. IndiaMfg. Co., 118 Id. 896; Grizzle v.
Frost, 3 Fost. & F. 622; Gilman v. Bd. Co., 18 Allen (Mass.) 433,
441,442; Coal Co. v. Reid, 3 Macq. 266-295; Hillv. Gust, 55 Ind.
45 ; Rd. Co. v. Valerins, 56 Id. 511 ; Rd. Co. v. Fort,17 Wall.
553; Thompson v. Bd. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 564; Cook v. Rd. Co.,
24 N. W. Rep. 311; Anderson v. Morrison,22 Minn. 274; Strahlendorf v. Rosenthal, 30 Wis. 674. These cases, and many others
which might be cited, fully establish the rule as above stated in regard
to the employment of servants who, by reason of youth, inexperience, or want of capacity, are unable to comprehend the dangers
incident to a hazardous employment.
There are many reasons given by the courts for holding to the
rule above stated, the most satisfactory of which are, 1st, that the
master owes a duty towards an employee who is directed to perform
a hazardous and dangerous work, or to perform his work in a dangerous place, where the employee, from want of age, inexperience,
or general capacity, does not comprehend the dangers, to point out
to him the dangers incident to the employment, and thus enable
him to comprehend, and so avoid them, and that neglect to discharge
such duty is gross negligence on the part of the employer; 2d, that
such an employee does not assume the risk of the dangers incident
to such hazardous employment, because he does not comprehend
them, and the law will not therefore presume that he contracted to
assume them.
In the case of Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., supra, a
boy of the age of fourteen years was employed to work in a dangerous place, on account of the machinery which was in operation
in his immediate vicinity, and the court say: "The notice which
the defendants were obliged to g:ive the plaintiff of the nature of
the risk incident to the service which he undertook, must be such
as to enable a person of his youth and inexperience in the business
intelligently to appreciate the nature of the danger attending its
performance. The question, indeed, on this branch of the case, is
not of due care on the part of the plaintiff, but whether the cause
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of the injury was one of which he knowingly assumed the risk, or
one which, by reason of his incapacity to understand and appreciate its dangerous character, or neglect of the defendant to take
due precautions to effectually inform him thereof, the defendants
were bound to indemnify him against the consequences. But in
determining this question, it is proper andf necessary to take into
consideration, not only the plaintiff's youth and inexperience, but
also, the nature of the service which he was to perform, and the
degree to which his attention, while at work, would need to be devoted to its performance. The obligation of the defendant would
not necessarily be discharged by merely informing the boy that the
employment itself, or a particular place or machine in the building
or room in which he was to work was dangerous. Mere information
in advance that the service was dangerous, or a particular thing
connected with it was dangerous, might give him no adequate notice
or understanding of the kind and degree of danger which would
necessarily attend the actual performance of his work."
In the case of Grizzle v. Trout, supra, a girl- sixteen years old
was employed in a rope factory about a dangerous machine. The
court say: "There is evidence both of negative and positive negligence on his part [meaning on the part of the foreman of the defendanti; negative, in not giving the girl proper instructions as to
the use of the machine ; positive, in expressly directing her to do
the very thing she had done, and which was admitted was dangerous, so dangerous, indeed, that the case for the defence was that she
had been told not to do it." In regard to the negligence of the
foreman being the negligence of the defendants, in a case of this
kind, the court say; "The foreman was put by them [defendants]
in their place to employ this young person in and about dangerous
machinery of which she was quite'ignorant, and any negligence of
his in the matter would be negligence for which they would be
responsible."
In the case of Rd. Co. v. Fort, upra, a boy sixteen years old
was injured while in the employ of the railroad company in a machine shop, and while performing a hazardous act in connection
with the machinery, and not within the scope of his general employment. He undertook to do the dangerous act by order of one Collett,
under whose control and superintendence he was at the time. The
court, in the opinion, say : "But this boy occupied a very different
position. How would he be expected to know the peril of the under-
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taking. He was a mere youth, without experience, and not familiar
with machinery. Not being able to judge for himself, he had the
right to rely on the judgment of Collett, and doubtless entered upon
the-execution of the order without apprehension of danger. Be that
as it may, it was a wrongful act on the part of Collett to order
a boy, of his age and inexperience, to do a thing which, in its very
nature, was perilous, and which any ordinary man would know to
be so. * * * For the consequence of this hasty action the company are liable, either upon the maxim of respondeat suiperior, or
upon the obligation arising out of the contract of service. The
order of Collet was their order. They cannot escape responsibility
on the plea that he should not have given it."
In- Coal Co. v. Beid, 3 Macq. 266-295, the Scotch case of
O'JByrne v. Burn is referred to by Lord CRANWORTH in his opinion. He states the facts of that case as follows: " The plaintiff
was a girl, employed by the defendant in his clay mill. She was
altogether inexperienced, having been only nine days in the defendant's service, and she was therefore unaware of the risks from the
machinery. Anderson, acting under Burn as the manager of the
works, put her to remove some waste clay while the rollers were in
motion. This was a duty which Anderson ought to have performed
himself, and it ought not to have been done at all until he had
caused the movement of the rollers to be suspended. The pursuer,
in attempting to remove the waste in obedience to Anderson's order,
sustained a severe-injury from the rollers in making the attempt;
and she raised an action against Burn for damages. The lord ordinary held the allegation relevant, so as to entitle her to issues for
the trial of the case." After stating the facts of the case as above
quoted, Lord CRANWORTH says: " This might have been quite
right. It may be that if a master employs inexperienced workmen,
and directs them to act under the superintendent, and to obey the
orders of a deputy, whom he puts in his place, they are not, within
the meaning of the rule in question, employed in a common work
with the superintendent. They are acting in obedience to the
express commands of their employer, and if he, by the carelessness
of his deputy, exposes them to improper risks, it may be he is liable
for the consequences."
In the case of the same Coal Co..v. MeGuire, 3 Macq. 311, the
Lord Chancellor, referring to the case of O'JByrne v. Burn, says:
"It was hardly possible to apply the principle of the servant hay.
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ing undertaken the service with a knowledge of the risks incident
to it. She was an inexperienced girl, employed in a hazardous
manufactory, placed under the control, and it might be added the
protection, of an overseer, who was appointed by the defendant, and
intrusted with this duty; and it might well be considered that, by
employing such a helpless and ignorant child, the master contracted
to keep her out of harm's way in assigning to her any work to be
performed."
In the case of Stahlendorfv. Rosenthal, supra, this court held
that "one who agrees to work for another in any employment takes
upon himself the usual risks of such employment; but if there
exist facts known to the employer, and unknown to the employee,
increasing the risk of such employment, the employer is bound to
disclose such facts to his employee; otherwise, he will be liable for
such negligence, in case of injury to the latter resulting from such
unusual risks." In this case the court was speaking of an adult
employee, who is presumed to understand and comprehend the ordi.
nary risks of his employment. The rule stated in this last case,
when applied to the employment of a person who from youth, inexperience, or want of intelligence, is incapable of comprehending the
risk connected with a hazardous employment, would require the
master to inform the employee of such dangers before putting him
at his work, and if he failed to do so, would render him liable for
an injury resulting from the danger which was known to the employer and unknown to the employee. The other cases cited place
the liability of the master, in case of the employment of children,
or other persons who are not competent to appreciate the risks of a
hazardous employment, upon like ground.
The case of Sullivan v. India Mfg. Co., 113 Mass. 396, is not in
conflict with the cases in 102 Mass. and 13 Allen. The case in 113
Mass. simply holds that if a child be employed to operate a machine,
and the employer fails to give proper instructions as to the manner
of using it, the master will not be held liable, if it appears that the
child had obtained the proper knowledge for using the machine
from other sources before the accident happened.
It is said by the learned counsel for the respondent, that infancy
and inexperience do not modify the rule of fellow-servants. But
that statement only holds good, where it appears that such employee
has been properly instructed by his employer, as to the dangers of
his employment, or has acquired knowledge of such danger from
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other sources. When he has been properly inst-ucted, and knows
the dangers of his employment, then he stands on the same footing
as any other employee, and cannot recover for any injury caused by
the negligence of his fellow-servant: see Curran v. Merchants'
Manufacturing Co., 180 Mass. 374 ; Sullivan v. India Manufacturing Co., 113 Id. 396-399; Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn.
274.
In the case at bar, the evidence on the part of the plaintiff shows,
that the plaintiff was less than fifteen years old when he entered
into the employment of the defendant. The evidence on both sides
shows, that when he was first employed, and up to the day he was
injured, he was employed to work above ground, a work which was
not apparently hazardous work. There is no evidence that he had
ever before worked underground in a mine, or that he was at all
familiar with the dangers of such employment. That the work
under ground was not considered proper work for a bojof his age
to perform, may be presumed from the fact that the defendant's captain and his boss both testified that they had forbidden him to go
down into the mine for any purpose. The other evidence shows
that the mine was a dangerous place to work in, from the fact that
blasting was constantly going on in the mine, and that the consequence of such blasting was to loosen the ore and rock in the roof
and sides of the mine, so that there was danger from the falling of
such ore and rock; and the evidence establishes conclusively the
fact that the plaintiff was injured by ore falling from the roof of
the mine.
We are very clear that upon the evidence in the case, the question
should have been submitted to the jury, whether the plaintiff was at.
work in the mine at the time of the injury, by direction of the pit
boss or of the captain of the mine; and, if so at work by such direction, then whether he was of sufficient age and experience, or had
sufficient information from the captain or pit boss, or from any other
source, to comprehend the dangers incident to such employment.
Had the jury found that the plaintiff was sent to work in the mine
by the pit boss or captain of the mine, on the day the accident happened, and that, from his age, inexperience, and want of information, he did not comprehend the dangers attendant upon such
employment, then the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover,
although the injury was the result of the negligence of the miners,
who were his fellow-servants.
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The fact that the plaintiff was employed- up to the day of the
accident, to work above ground, at an employment not of a hazardous character, can have but little bearing on the question of the
defendant's liability, except so far as it might, in connection with
the other evidence in the case, tend to show that the persons representing the defendant did not consider it proper to employ a boy of
his age to work under ground in the mine. The evidence on the
part of the plaintiff shows that there was no agreement to work,
only at one kind of work, but that he was to be at the direction of
the pit boss, and do such work as he was ordered by him to do.
If he directed him to go into the mine to work, the plaintiff had
the right, and perhaps it was his duty to go to work there. The
real question to be determined, so far as the plaintiff's rights are
concerned, is this: Did the defendant, through its agents, do its
duty towards the plaintiff, when they sent him to work in the mine,
(if he was sent to work there), by informing him of the dangers
incident to that kind of work? or was the plaintiff of-sufficient age
and experience, or had he sufficient knowledge on the subject, to
comprehend the dangers incident to such employment? These
questions should have been submitted to the jury. It was error,
therefore, to nonsuit the plaintiff.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for a new trial.
I. Master's Liabilityfor Injury to Infant Employee.-The infancy of the employee does not enable him to repudiate
his agreement, implied in the contract of
service, to assume all the risks of his
employment which are patent or are
explained to him and. brought home to
his understanding. This point is clearly
stated by the court in the case of De
Graff v. New York Central, 4-e., Rd.
Co., 76 N.Y. 125, 132. "The fact that
the plaintiff was a minor I do not think
affects the question. There are many
expressions of judges, that the assumption by employees of the risks incident
to the business and the negligence of
co-servants arises from an implied agreement to that effect. In others the modified liabilities of principals to employees
are founded upon considerations of public policy At all events it is an element

of the employment. If a minor engages
to work, the risks of the business are
incident to the work. He cannot claim
on account of infancy to be relieved from
the consequences of such risks. He might
as well claim to enforce the contract for
his wages without performing any service.
If a child of unsuitable age should be
employed in a hazardous business, or
exposed to unsuitable risks, a different
question might be presented. Here no
question is made but that the plaintiff
was competent for the service which he
was employed to render, and no negligence is imputed to the defendant for
employing him on that account. So in
considering the question of contributory
negligence, the age and experience of
the plaintiff, is often a material consideration, but there is no such point involved in this case."

JONES v. FLORENCE RMINING CO.
The preponderance of authority supports the view advanced in this casethat the infancy of the employee does not
enable him to repudiate his implied assumption of all patent risk incident to
his employment: Anderson v. Morrison,
22 Minn. 274 ; Xing v. Boston, 4-c., Rd.
Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 112; Reardon v.
New York, 4-c., Co., 51 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
Rep. 134. But see contra, Beach Contrib. Neg. p. 360.
HI. Does the infancy of the employee,
using the word infancy in its strict legal
sense, have any effect upon the master's
liability to him for personal injuries ? It
is thought that it does not. The fundamental.rule of law governing the master's liability to his employee for personal
'injuries received by the latter in the
course of his employment is that the
servant assumes the patent risks of his
employment. Related to this rule of
law, is the rule of law that it is the duty
of the master to point out and explain to
the person seeking employment such
risks of the employment which the master knows of which are not patent.
We must now endeavor to define what
is meant by a "patent" risk, and what
.is the extent of the master's duty to
point out and explain risks that are not
patent. It is thought that the word
"6patent," as used in the rule of law
above stated, means apparent or obvious
to a person of the degree of intelligence
and judgment which the master is justified in assuming the person seeking employment to be, judging from his own
knowledge of the person, or, in the absence of such knowledge, from the general appearance of such person. The
word does nut mean obvious or apparent
to a person of average intelligence and
judgment. It is used relatively, not
absolutely. Similarly the duty of the
master to explain non-patent dangers is
relative and not absolute. It is his duty
to make such explanations of hidden
dangers as.would be sufficient to bring
the nature and extent of such dangers

home to the understanding-not of the
man of average intelligence and judgment, but to a person of the degree of intelligence and judgment, which the master, taking into consideration his knowledge of the capacity of the person seeking employment, is justified in assuming
him to possess.
Let us now revert to the question proposed at the outset: Does the infancy
of the employee (using the word infancy
in its technical sense) affect the master's
liability to him for personal injuries received in the course of his employment.?
It is clear that it does not. We have
seen that the infancy of the employee
does not enable him to repudiate his
implied assumption of the patent risks
of his employment. It could have no
other effect upon the mastei's liability
unless the law should assume arbitrarily
that no infant was possessed of the same
degree of intelligence and judgment as
an adult, and should accordingly hold
that dangers which would be patent to
an adult of average intelligence and
judgment would be non-patent to any
infant no matter how intelligent, as a
matter of fact, he might be-that risks
patent to an adult of twenty-one years
and one month are not patent to an infant of twenty years and eleven months.
But the law makes no such arbitrary assumption against the intelligence of an
infant, as far as the rule of law governing a master's liability to a servant for
It
personal injuries are concerned.
makes no special rule for the case of
infant employees. In determining the
fact whether a given risk was patent or
not, or the sufficiency of a master's explanation of hidden dangers, the law looks
alone to the degree of intelligence and
judgment which the master is justified in
assuming the person seeking such employment to have. The question of the
patency of the risk, or the sufficiency of
the master's explanation, is in doubtful
cases one of fact for the jury, and in
passing upon this question they must con-
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sider the fact that the employee injured
was of immature age, not necessarily as a
controlling fact in the case, bat in connection with the other facts of the case
bearing upon the capacity of the employee. (Of course the immaturity of
the employee's age is not material, except
so far as it is known to the master, but
ordinarily this fact if it exists will be
disclosed by the employee's appearance.)
The following authorities, which all
relate to injuries caused by machinery, it
is thought fully bear out the views above
expressed.
In Williams v. Churchill, 137 Mass.
243; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 304, the plaintiff was injured by becoming entangled
in the loose end of a rope which he was
engaged in making fast around a cleat
in the bow of a tug boat on which he was
employed. The plaintiff was an infant.
Homes, J., delivering the opinion of
the court said: "It was urged that the
plaintiff was under age and inexperienced
and that the behavior of the loose end
of a, taut rope was a hidden danger. But
the plaintiff was overnineteen years old,
had lived on the sea shore all his life,
had been to sea three summers, and had
been on this boat four months, the time
which it took his, brother to become familiar with the duties on board and to get
promoted. Taking these facts, in connectign with the nature of the employment
which he had accepted, the master had a
right to assume that the plaintiff knew
how to handle a line, and to order him
to do so without special warning or instruction." See also Grizzle v. Frost, 3
F. & F. 622 ; Rd.Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall.
(U. S.) 554; Fones Y. Plillips 39 Ark.
17 ; Coombs v. Cordage Co., 102 Mass.
572.
In Anderson V. Morrison, 22 Minn.
274, the defendant had employed the
plaintiff, a boy of fourteen, to work in
and about an elevator in his cotton mill.
Subsequently he set plaintiff at work in
running a picking machine. The danger
attending work at the picking machine
VoL. XXXIV.-75

was greater than that attending work at
the elevator. The court held that the
defendant was not necessarily derelict in
setting plaintiff at the more dangerous
work. They say: "If an employer
should set an adult, who had capacity to
take care of himself, and who knew the
risks, to do a dangerous work, of course
the employer would not be liable for an
injury occurring to the employee in doing
the work. And it would be the same
if the employee were a minor, but of
sufficient capacity to avoid the danger,
and who knew of the danger to be
avoided."
See King v. Boston, 6,c.,
Rd. Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 112 ; Curran
v. Merchants' Mfg. Co., 130 Mass. 374.
In Hayden v. Smithville Mfg. Co., 29
Conn. 548, the court, after laying down
the general principle that a servant with
knowledge of the risks of his employment assumes such risks, say: "We
need hardly remark, that as this distinction rests upon knowledge in the enaployee, it is quite obvious that he must
have mind sufficient to acquire the necessary knowledge. How the fact was in
the present case (the plaintiff being ten
years old), we will not undertake to
decide. If the fact was important we
think it should have been submitted to
the consideration of the jury. Nor will
we say whether it is proper or not to hold
that a child of sufficient age to be employed in the business of a mill for reward, is mature enough to appreciate the
hazard of his employment. We make
the suggestion for what it is worth should
the cause come to another trial."
So in Sullivan v. India Mfg. Co., 113
Mass. 396, the court say: "It may frequently happen that the dangers of a
particular position for, or mode of doing
work, are great, and apparent to persons
of capacity and knowledge of the subject, and yet a party from youth, inexperience, ignorance, or general want of
capacity may fail to appreciate them. It
would be a breach of duty on the part
of a master to expose a servant of this
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character, even with his own consent, to
such dangers, unless with instructions or
cautions sufficient to enable him to com
prebend them, and to do his work safely.
It was, therefore, competent for the
plaintiff to show that there had been such
a breach of duty on the part of the defendants, and although he had in fact
gone to work in the place pointed out,
assenting so to do, yet that he was
incapable of appreciating the dangers to
which he exposed himself, or of doing
the work safely without instructions or
cautions which he did not receive." See
also O'Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 427;
Parkhurstv. Johnson, 50 Mich. 70; S.c.
45 Ai. Rep. 28 ; Reardon v. NewYork,
4-c., Co., 51 N. Y. Sup. Ct. R.134 ; Cosvello v. Judson, 21 Hun (N. Y.) 396;
McGinnis v. CanadaSouthern Bridge Co.,
49 Mich. 466 ; Hill v. Gust, 55 Ind. 45.
In Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 420,
it was held that the mere fact that the
employee knew of the exposed and dangerous position of certain machinery did
not necessarily preclude a recovery. The
court say: "Even if he (the employee)
had known of the cogs and their unguarded condition, it would not thereby
conclusively follow that he could not recover. Other facts and circumstances
would have to be considered in connectiou therewith; his age, his intelligence,
his experience and such like, so that the
jury might ascertain and determine whether he fully understood and appreciated

the danger." See Howard Oil Co. v.
Farmer, 56 Tex. 301.
In Fones v. Phillips, 39 Ark. 17, it
was held that an instruction, "where a
child is employed at or about dangerous
machinery, it is the duty of the employer
to see that he is of sufficient age and intelligence to understand the nature of
the risks to which he is exposed. And
it is the further duty of the employer to
explain to him the risks reasonable to be
apprehended, in such a manner as to enable a person of his youth and capacity,
to intelligently appreciate the nature of
the danger ordinarily attending its perforinance, and a failure to do this would
be a want of ordinary care in the employer. And it is for the jury under all
the circumstances of the case at bar, to
say whether the defendants have discharged their duty in that behalf, and if
not they were guilty of negligence. And
in determining this question, the jury
should, together with the other facts
proven, take into consideration the age,
capacity, intelligence and character of
the injured party," was a correct statement of the abstract law, althougli improper in that particular case, as the
evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff. who was a minor, had been fully
instructed. as to the dangers of the machine by which he was injured, and was
of sufficient intelligence to comprehend
the nature of the risks of his employment.
Louis M. Gnas.xY.
Chicago, ill.

Court of Error8 and Appeal8 of Delaware.
WILLIAM H. SWIFT, PRESIDENT OF THE DIAMOND MATCH
COLHPANY, v. THE STATE OF DELAWARE, Ex nRL. DAVID M.
RICHARDSON.
A foreign corporation transacting business in a state, submits itself to the law of
that state, and its resident officers, may be compelled by mandamus, to allow a stockholder to inspect and take copies of corporate books and papers in the possession of
such officers.
Such a writ may be granted at the suit of a stockholder, who is neither a resident
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of the state where the corporation was incorporated, nor of the state where the writ
is asked for, and when the inspection is asked for in aid of a suit, in a foreign state,
between a stockholder and a thitd persou, to which suit the corporation is not a
party.
R., a resident of Michigan, filed a petition in a Delaware court, against S., president of the D. Company, S. being a resident of Delaware, and the D. Company
being a corporation of the state of Connecticut, doing business in Delaware. The
petition asked for a mandamus to compel S. to allow R., who was a stockholder of
the D. Company, to inspect and make copies of certain books and papers of the D.
Company, in the possession of S., and which R. desired for use in a suit in the
state of Michigan, between R. and a third person: Held, that the court had jurisdiction ; that the corporation was not a necessary party, and that as R., as a stockholder, had a right to inspect the corporate papers material to his suit, in the possession of S., the mandamus should be granted.

to New Castle County.
Mandamus. At the May Term, A. D. 1884, of the Superior Court
of the state of Delaware, in and for New Castle county, David M.
Richardson presented his petition to the court for a writ of mandamus against William H. Swift, President of the Diamond Match
Company, of which Richardson was a stockholder, to compel inspection and liberty to take copies of certain books and papers of
the company in the custody of Swift, in the city of Wilmington, in
the state of Delaware, the inspection having been allowed, but copies
denied.
The relator claimed the inspection and copies for use in a suit
pending in the state of Michigan, of which he was a resident, the
history and character of which suit is as follows: Mr. Richardson,
a large stockholder of the Diamond Match Company, in 1879 and
1880 entered into contracts with Christian H. BuhI and Russell A.
Alger, of Detroit, by which Russell and Alger were to become
surety for Richardson to the United States on his bond for match
stamps, and also to endorse certain notes of Richardson, who thereupon transferred a large block of stock of the Diamond Match
Company to Russell and Alger, as collateral security, and they
were to receive a proportion of the net earnings of the stock
pledged, and not merely of the dividends declared on the stock.
It was agreed that on such settlement no loss that may be charged
on account of the purchase and sale by the company of other match
factories should be taken into account, and that the earnings were
to be estimated from the trial balances or books of the company, and
allowance was to be made for loss or shrinkage in value of the company, and consideration taken of the improvements made out of the
earnings.
ERROR
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In September 1883, Messrs. Buhl and Alger advertised the stock
at public sale, claiming that although their liability on the bond
had ceased, and all the notes which they had endorsed for Richardson
had been paid by him, yet that there was still due them about
$60,000, for net earnings of the Diamond Match Company during
1881 and 1882. Mr. Richardson denied this liability, and filed a
bill in equity in the Superior Court of Detroit for an injunction to
restrain the sale, and for an accounting of the amount due Russell
and Alger under the contract. The case in Michigan is at issue
and ready for proofs to be taken.
It is for use as evidence in this suit that Mr. Richardson desires
to have copies of certain books and papers, the right to take the
copies having been refused by Mr. Swift by order of the board of
directors of the company.
The petition of the relator alleges that he is a resident of Michigan, and that the Diamond Match Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Connecticut; that the suit in
Michigan relates wholly to, and involves the necessity of ascertaining what were, the true net earnings during the years 1881 and
1882, and what deductions from the earnings were proper to be
made on account of loss and shrinkage of the property of said company, and what sums should be charged for improvements and
expenditures necessary to be made in order to enable said company
to make such earnings or profits; and that it is necessary for him
to have access for this purpose to certain books, &c., and to certain
instruments of purchase and sale during those years, and to certain bonds, contracts and agreements not to engage in the business
of making matches entered into and paid during those years.
That said instruments, &c., are not now kept in Connecticut, but
are now in the custody and control of the respondent in the city of
Wilmington, the place of residence of Swift.
The relator further avers, that he wishes the inspection not from
any idle curiosity or for any improper purpose, but solely because
the books, &c., furnish the best evidence and in many cases the
only evidence of the facts shown thereby; that said facts are material and necessary in his suit, and that he cannot safely proceed to
a hearing without such evidence; and the petition concludes with a
prayer for liberty to inspect and make copies of certain specific
instruments, &c., relating to the business of the company during
the years 1881 and 1882.
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On filing the petition the usual rule to show cause issued, and the
respondent filed a motion to quash the said rule for the reasons that
the company was a corporation organized under the laws of Connecticut, and as such not subject to the jurisdiction of the court;
and for the further reason that the rule was issued against the
respondent by the designation of the president, and not against
him as a public officer recognised by the laws of this state as charged
with any public duty by the laws of this state.
Subsequently the respondent was directed to answer the rule, and
an agreement was made in open court that the motion to quash should
be heard at the time of the hearing of said rule, as if no answer
had been filed; and if upon the hearing of the said motion and
rule the court should be of opinion that a writ of mandamus should
be granted, that a peremptory writ and not an alternative writ should
be issued.
The material parts of the answer are stated in the opinion of
Chancellor SAULSBURY.
The case was argued at the November Term of the Superior
Court by William 0. Spruance, of Wilmington, and George V. V.
Lothrop and William H. Lillibridge,of Detroit, for the relator, and
George Gray and Benj. Nields, of Wilmington, for the respondent.
At the February Term the rule was made absolute, and it was
ordered by the court (COMEGYS, C. J., and HOUSTON, J., concurring, and WooTEN, J., dissenting), that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue against the respondent as prayed for.
A writ of error was taken on this judgment to the Court of
Errors and Appeals, consisting of Chancellor SAULSBURY, and
HoUSTow and GRUBB, JJ., and argued at the June Term 1886 by
Grayand Nields, for the plaintiff in error, and
Ispruance and Lillibridge, for the defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SAULSBURY, Chancellor.-The case comes before us upon a writ
of error to a judgment of the Superior Court of this state, in and
for New Castle county, in favor of David M. Richardson against
William H. Swift, President of the Diamond Match Company.
Richardson was the holder and owner of shares of stock in the
Diamond Match Company, a corporation under the laws of Connecticut. Swift was a director and president of said company and
resides in this state.
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As a stockholder in said company, Richardson applied to Swift
for permission to inspect and take copies of certain papers and documents in his possession, for a purpose which he alleged was necessary and proper and material to his interest as a stockholder in said
company. Inspection was not refused, but permission to make
copies or memoranda of said papers and documents was refused.
Thereupon Richardson presented his petition to the court below,
praying said court to award a writ of mandamus against Swift,
commanding him to suffer and permit said Richardson to inspect
and make copies of the instruments, books, papers and writings in
his custody or control belonging to the said Diamond Match Company, to wit: 1. All contracts and agreements for the purchase by
or on behalf of the said Diamond Match Company of match factories and other property relating to the same prior to January 1st
1881. 2. All instruments in writing conveying or assigning to
said company or other persons in its behalf property, 'rights or
franchises relating to the manufacture of matches prior to said lastmentioned day. 3. All contracts, agreements or conveyances relating to said purchase of property by or on behalf of said company,
other than for materials or supplies in the usual course of its business prior to said last-mentioned day. 4. All bonds, contracts and
agreements not to engage in the match business made to or with
said company prior to said last-mentioned day. 5. All books,
papers and writings of said company, showing the net earnings of
the company for and during the years 1881 and 1882.
To Richardson's petition Swift filed an answer, in which he does
not deny that the papers and documents mentioned in Richardson's
petition and sworn to be in his possession, were in his possession
at the time of the service of the writ, or were then in his possession, but states, "that the law of the said state of Connecticut under
which said corporation was c'.eated and exists provides, that ' the
statements and books of every such corporation shall be kept in
the town where it is located, and shall at all reasonable times be
open to the inspection of its stockholders, and as often as once in
each year, a true statement of the accounts shall be made and exhibited to the stockholders.' And the said law further provides,
'that the president and treasurer of every joint stock corporation shall annually, on or before the 15th day of February or
August, lodge with the town clerk of the town in which said corporation is located, a certificate signed and sworn to by him, showing
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the condition of its affairs as nearly as the same can be ascertained
on the 1st day of December or January, or on the 1st day of June
or July next preceding the time of making such certificate in the
following particulars, to wit : 1. The amount of the capital stock
actually paid in; 2. The cash value of its real estate; 3. The cash
value of its personal estate, exclusive of patents; 4. The amount
of its debts; 5. The amount of its credits; 6. The name, residence and number of shares of each stockholder."
The defendant Swift also in his answer says: "That in conformity to the provisions of the said law as aforesaid, the statement
and books of the said corporation have been and are now kept in
the town of New- Haven,. where it is located as aforesaid, and have
been at all times, and are now, open to the inspection of any of
the stockholders, and that in the month of February in each year
since the organization of said corporation, the certificates required
by said law as aforesaid, signed and sworn to by the president and
treasurer of the said corporation, have been duly lodged with the
town clerk of said town of New Haven, and duplicates thereof,
made and sworn to as required by said law, have been lodged by
them as aforesaid with the secretary of the said state of Connecticut; and that in all respects the requirements of the said law
as set forth in the relator's exhibit ' B' have been fully and faithfully complied with by the said corporation and its officers, and
that the said statements and books were not, at the time of the
filing of said petition, or at any time since, in the custody or possession of the said William H. Swift."
Now it will be observed that the relator's exhibit "B" in respect
to which Swift in his answer says that the requirements of the law
have been fully and faithfully complied with by the said corporation
and its officers, relates only to, 1. The amount of the capital stock
actually paid in ; 2. The cash value of its real estate; .8. The cash
value of its personal property exclusive of patents; 4. The amount
of its debts; 5. The amount of its credits; 6. The name, residence
and number of shares of such stockholders. And it was in reference to these that Swift says, ' that the said statements and books
were not at the time of the filing of the said petition, or at any
time since, in the custody or possession of the said William H.
Swift.'"
He nowhere makes a similar declaration in respect to the documents and papers, an inspection of which, and the privilege of
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making copies of which, was demanded of him by the relator, and
the privilege of taking copies of which was refused by him. This
will appear manifest from the answer of Swift to the petition filed
in the court below. He therein says that, "this respondent is without authority from said corporation to permit, and is expressly prohibited by said corporation from permitting the said relator to,
make copies of its books, papers or instruments of writing, which
may be in his custody or control as president of said corporation, for
the purposes mentioned in said petition, unless required so to do
by the laws of the state of Connecticut, under which the said corporation exists."
He further says, "that to allow copies of all the instruments,
bonds, contracts, agreements, books, papers or writings belonging
to the said corporation, and mentioned in said relator's petition, to
be made by the relator for use and publication in his paid suit,
would greatly impede, hinder and obstruct the conduct of the business of the said corporation, and injure and greatly damage the
interests of the same, and of its other stockholders."
From this also it appears that the papers and documents mentioned in the relator's petition as in the possession of the said Swift,
and the privilege of taking copies of which was demanded by him,
and refused by the said Swift at the city of Wilmington, where
they were in said Swift's possession, were not the same as those
required to be kept in New Haven by the act of the state of Connecticut under which the Diamond Match Company was organized,
and were not the same statements and books as those mentioned in
the relator's exhibit " B," which Swift in his answer says were not
at the time of the filing of the said petition, or at any time since
in the custody or possession of the said William H. Swift.
When Swift says, "that the said relator has been furnished with
statements showing fully and accurately what were the net earnings
of the said corporation during the years 1881 and 1882, and has
been permitted by the said corporation full and free access to all
books, aecounts, bonds and paper mentioned in his petition, and to
inspect the same personally, or by his attorney," he nowhere denies
that demand was made upon him by the relator for permission to
make copies of the books, accounts, bonds and papers, and that such
demand was refused by him.
The right to make copies and to make abstracts and memoranda
of documents, books and papers by a stockholder in an incorporated
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company, is as full and complete as the right of inspection thereof.
David M. Richardson, the relator, a resident of the state of
Michigan, was and is a stockholder of the Diamond Match Company, a corporation created under the laws of the state of Connecticut. William H. Swift, a resident of the city of Wilmington, in
the state of Delaware, was and is a stockholder in the said corporation, and president thereof.
There was and is no law of the state of Connecticut, requiring.
that the president of said corporation should be a resident of the
state of Connecticut.
There was and is no law of said state, requiring that the papers
and documents mentioned in the relator's petition should be kept
in New Haven, or in the state of Connecticut. They were in fact
kept in the city of Wilmington, in the state of Delaware, and in
the possession of William H. Swift, at the time of the demand and
refusal of the privilege of copying the same, and are there yet in
the same possession so far as we know from anything in this case.
The grounds upon which the awarding the mandamus was resisted in the court below, and upon which the reversal of the judgment below is asked in this court, are sufficiently stated in the
answei of Swift, and are as follows: "And the said William H.
Swift further says that the said David M. Richardson and the said
Christian H. Buhl and Russell A. Alger are all residents of the
state of Michigan, and, the controversy and suit pending between
them, as appears from the said relator's petition and exhibits filed,
arises upon a contract entered into between them in the said, state
of Michigan, and which was made with respect to the laws of the
said state; and the said controversy and suit do not arise upon any
contract or engagement entered into in the state of Delaware, or
with respect to the laws thereof.
That the said controversy or suit is not with or against the said
corporation, or for the purpose of establishing or maintaining any
right of the said relator as a member of the said corporation; or
compelling the exercise or performance by any officer thereof of
any corporate function or duty.
And that the suit or controversy does not arise out of or upon
any contract or engagement by or on behalf of said corporation, or
out of or by reason of any duty imposed by law upon said corporation, and that the said corporation is not a party to said suit or
VOL. :XXV.-76
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interested therein, and can in no wise be affected by its determination.
That this respondent is without authority from said corporation
for permitting said relator to make copies of any of its books, papers
or instruments of writing, which may be in his custody or control as
president of said corporation, for the purposes mentioned in said
petition, unless required so to do by the laws of the state of Connecticut under which the said corporation exists. That to allow
copies of all the instruments, bonds, contracts, agreements, books,
papers or writings belonging to the said corporation, and mentioned
in said relator's petition, to be made by the relator for use and publication in his said suit, would greatly impede, hinder and obstruct
the conduct of the business of the said corporation, and injure and
greatly damage the interests of the same and of its other stockholders.
A mandamus may be defined to be a command issuing from the
Superior Court, directed to some person, corporation or inferior
court, within the jurisdiction of the superior court, requiring them
to do some particular thing therein specified which by law they are
bound to do, and which a superior court has previously determined,
or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice.
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this case to trace the origin
and history of the writ of mandamus. While it is true that in
England it was originally what is called a "prerogative writ," and
is there generally treated as such, in this state, and in this country,
it is simply a writ divested of all its prerogative features, for the
enforcement of a remedy by a person having a legal right against
another person withholding that right. Prerogative writs, as such,
may be said to have no existence in this state, or in this country.
The writ of mandamus, and the right to it in all cases to which
it is applicable, is as clearly recognised in our jurisprudence as any
other writ which may be issued out of the courts of law to which a
party may be entitled.
A clear recognition of this as settled law will go far to divest the
character of the writ of much seeming mystery or obscurity of
meaning with which it has been customary to surround it, and will
greatly simplify the issue involved in this cause, which is nothing
more nor less in its nature or character than a suit at law between
one person as plaintiff and another as defendant.
Thus considered, the only questions for us to decide in this case
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are, has David M. Richardson, the plaintiff, shown a clear right
against William H. Swift to be permitted by him to inspect and
take copies of the papers in the petition mentioned? Has he made
demand and been refused the privilege of so doing by said Swift ?
Has he any other remedy, or is the writ of mandamus his only
specific remedy for the enforcement of a clear right which has been
denied him? Has he-no other adequate or specific legal remedy to
compel the inspection, and the right to take copies of the papers
and documents mentioned in his petition ? Has the relator shown
a clear legal right to the particular thing which he has demanded ?
Has the right been refused by William H. Swift? Did Swift act
wrongfully and illegally in refusing the relator's right, and is there
no other way in which the relator can legally enforce his right,
except by the writ of mandamus ?
These are the questions, and the only questions which are necessary to be decided by us.
The writ of mandamus only issues where there is a clear and
specific legal right to be enforced, or a duty which ought to be, and
can be performed, and where there is no other specific and adequate
legal remedy. The right which it is sought to protect must, therefore, be clearly established, and the writ is never granted in doubtful
cases. The exercise of the jurisdiction to grant it rests, to a considerable extent, in the sound discretion of the court, subject always
to the well-settled principles which have been established by the
courts.
The test to be applied in determining the right to relief by mandamus, is to inquire whether the party aggrieved has a clear legal
right, and whether he has any other adequate remedy, since the
writ only belongs to those who have legal rights to enforce and find
themselves without an appropriate- legal remedy. "In such case,"
says High, "the right to the extraordinary aid of a mandamus may
be regarded to that extent as ex debito justitim." The relator must
show not only that he has a clear legal right to have the particular
thing in question done, but also the right to have it done by the
person against whom the writ is sought.
A corporation may have a mandamus to compel the custos of corporate documents to allow him an inspection, and copies of them,
at proper times and on proper occasions, he showing clearly a right
on his part to such inspection and copies, and refusal on the part
of the custos to allow it: Angel and Ames on Corp. 775, and notes
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of authorities cited; High on Injunctions. Indeed, upon this point
the authorities are uniform, and I shall not burden this opinion
with the citation and examination of the numerous authorities which
have established it as settled law.
Swift never in hisanswerobjects that the corporation, TheDiamond
Match Company, is not a party to the proceeding. He nowhere
denies that he is the custos of the papers, documents, &c., an inspection and copies of which has been demanded of him, and been
refused by him. If he was such custos, it was not necessary, in my
opinion, that the corporation should have been a party to the proceedings. Had the corporation been created by the laws of
this state it would not have been a necessary party to these proceedings. "Indeed," says Angel and Ames on Corp. 775, "it
(mandamus) lies to any person who happens to have the books of
the corporation in his possession and refuses to deliver them up."
And High, sect. 31, says, which is more pertinent to the point
under consideration, "as regards the person to whom the writ
should be directed, where an inspection of corporate records is
sought, the proper practice is to address it to the one actually having the custody of the books and records, even though it is merely
a ministerial officer acting under the direction of others, as in the
case of a bank cashier acting under a board of directors. In such
case the rule applies that the writ should run to the particular person who is to perform the act required, and the cashier having
charge of the books, his refusal to allow the inspection is his individual act, and the writ is therefore properly addressed to him,
though there can be no impropriety in such case in directing the
writ also to the board of directors."
If the writ should be addressed to the one actually having the
books and records, even though he is merely a ministerial officer
acting under the direction of others, as a cashier of a bank acting
under the board of directors (12 Wend. 183), it would seem that the
corporation was not only not a necessary party, but should not be
a party according to such practice, although the addition of the corporation or including it in the rule would not vitiate the proceedings, and the reason is this, that while the custos would be the
party to whom the writ should be addressed, he having the books,
papers, &c., in his possession, there would be no impropriety in
allowing the corporation, whose agent the custos was, to answer the
rule, and show cause, if they could, why their agent should not be
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compelled by the writ of mandamus to allow the inspection and
copies of the same. Taking this, therefore, to be the proper practice in cases where the custos is in possession of the documents and
papers an inspection and copies of which are demanded, and in cases
where the corporation is a domestic one, can there be any reason
why the rule should be different where the corporation is a foreign
one, the custos being domiciled in this state, and having possession
of the books, papers and documents by authority of the foreign
corporation? I can see none. Swift in his answer says, "that the
said Diamond Match Company is a corporation created by and existing under the laws- of the state of Connecticut, and is not a corporation created by or existing under any law of the state of Delaware, and that the same is located in the town of New Haven, in
the state of Connecticut, though it does hold real and personal
property in the state of Delaware, and transacts business incidental
to its business within the state of Connecticut."
Now if it holds real and personal property in the state of Dela-ware and transacts business incidental to its business within the
state of Connecticut, it holds such property and transacts such
business by the comity of the state. Its president lives here and
is the custos in fact of the documents and papers, an inspection of
which, and the privilege of taking copies of which, the relator seeks.
The corporation itself does business here, not as a corporation
created by the state of Delaware, but as a foreign corporation created by the law of Connecticut.
What results from this? That acting here as a foreign corporation, and holding real and personal property, and doing business as
such within this state, it submits or subjects itself to the law of the
state in the same manner and to the same extent, in respect to such
property and business, as it would be bound to do were it a corporation created by the state of Delaware, and owes obedience and
subjection to the mandates of its courts in these respects as fully as
if it were a domestic corporation.
Was William H. Swift the legal custos as well as the custos in
fact of the documents and papers, an inspection and copies of
which the relator seeks? No act of the legislature of Connecticut, and no by-law or rule of the corporation has been produced showing that provision was therein made for the custody
of said books and papers. Nothing has been shown us which
requires said documents and papers to be kept within the state of
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Connecticut. They have not been shown to have been in the possession of any other person than William H. Swift. William H.
Swift has for many years resided, and still resides, in the city or
Wilmington, in the state of Delaware. He has, and ever has had,
the actual possession and control of the same as far as their
history has been made known to us. His possession of them is
not to be presumed unlawful, but is I think presumed to be lawful.
Service of the rule was made upon him and an answer to it was
made by him. He signs himself to said answer as William H.
Swift, President of the Diamond Match Company. Now suppose
Mr. Richardson, the relator, instead of being a citizen and an inhabitant of the state of Michigan, was a citizen and inhabitant of
the state of Delaware, and a stockholder in the Diamond Match
Company, could any one reasonably doubt that the courts of Delaware would be competent to afford him the relief he asks by
granting him the State's writ of mandamus ? Does the fact that he
is a citizen and inhabitant of the state of Michigan affect his rights
in this respect? I think not. Hds he not the same rights as a
stockholder in the company to the inspection and copies of the
books, papers and documents in the possession of Swift, who must
be presumed to be the agent of the directors of the company in
respect to such books, papers and documents, and the custody thereof,
and who is in fact the president of the company, as he would have
were he a citizen and an inhabitant of the state of Delaware ? Has
he not the same rights in respect thereto in the courts of Delaware
as the citizen and inhabitant of Delaware would have? Sect. 2,
Art. 4, of the constitution provides that "the citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states." Among the rights secured, is the right to sue in
the courts of any state. This is settled by judicial decisions beyond
legal controversy.
It does not matter for the purpose of this case where the said
David M. Richardson and Christian H. Buhl and Russell A. Alger
reside, nor how the controversy and suit pending between them
arises. The question is, has the relator shown a clear right to
inspect and take copies of the books, papers and documents mentioned in his petition ? It is not material who are the parties to
r the suit in Michigan, mentionedT in the respondent's answer, nor
out of what it arises.
The question is, what are the rights of Richardson, the relator,
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as against Swift, the respondent, in respect to the papers and docaments, of which Swift is the legal custos ? It is not in the power
of the corporation to prohibit their president and agent from obeying the mandate of the court below. Courts of law are not prohibited from exercising their rightful jurisdiction by such feeble
authority, nor will they heed such impotent obstructions. If they
have jurisdiction, in all proper cases they will proceed to judgment
and execute their judgments in the manner the law provides.
But the respondent says, "that to allow copies of all the instruments, bonds, contracts, agreements, books, papers or writings
belonging to said corporation, and mentioned in said relator's petition, to be made by the relator for use and publication in his said
suit would greatly impede, hinder and obstruct the conduct of the
business of the said corporation, and injure and greatly damage
Why
the interests of the same and of its other stockholders."
awarding the writ of mandamus in this particular case bhould be
attended by such consequences to the corporation is not readily to
be perceived. If their transactions have been fair and just in all
respects to the members of the corporation and others, it is presumed that such transactions will bear the- light of inspection and
criticism, without impeding, hindering or obstructing the conduct
of the business of the corporation, or injuring it in any respect
whatever; but the right of Richardson to the relief he seeks depends
not upon the consequences that may result to the corporation, but
to the satisfaction of the court that he is entitled to the inspection
and copies of the papers mentioned in his petition.
It does not follow that though the court below had the right, and
it was their duty to award the writ of mandamus against Swift
under the circumstances of this case, that the power of the superior
court in respect to a foreign corporation is unlimited, and may be
exercised in respect to all matters in which foreign corporations are
concerned. The superior court, and even the state of Delaware itself,
cannot forfeit the charter of a foreign corporation. They cannot
compel the election of a stockholder, nor prevent the removal of
one. They cannot, in general, intermeddle with or control the
internal concerns of a foreign corporation. Their jurisdiction in
respect to such corporations is extremely limited, but they have
power to see that the officers, agents and servants of such corporations transacting business in this state by the comity of the state,
shall yield obedience to the laws of the state.

